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I. INTRODUCTION
The Council of Europe (CoE) Parliamentary Assembly in 2003
prepared a report on the "areas where the European Convention on
Human Rights cannot be applied,"' which aimed to identify the
difficulties that hinder the effective application of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or
the Convention)2 in certain geographic regions. The report presents a
panorama of mostly political situations related to areas "where the
application of the Convention comes up against insurmountable
obstacles ... either because of internal conflicts or as a result of the
occupation of part of a member state's territory by another state"3 and
where the State is unable to fully implement its international
obligations under the Convention. The report mentioned cases decided
or pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or
the Court) from Northern Cyprus, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and
Chechnya.4 While the armed conflict in Chechnya has not resulted in
any permanent loss of effective territorial control by Russia, the other
conflicts have produced an area outside the effective control of the
State having sovereign title over the territory (territorial State) and not
recognized by the overwhelming majority of the international
community as an independent State or part of a State other than the
territorial State.' Those areas can be termed "separatist areas" in the
1. EUR. PARL. Ass., Areas Where the European Convention on Human Rights
Cannot be Implemented, 3d Sess., Doc. 9730, (2003), http://assembly.coe.int/
nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?fileid-10095&lang-E [hereinafter Doc.
9730].
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 230 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter
European Convention on Human Rights].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. While the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) is recognised
only by Turkey, and both the "Republic of Abkhazia" and the "Republic of South
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sense that as a consequence of an armed conflict, they fall outside the
"effective control" of the territorial State, understood as "actual
authority" under the Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land.6 Almost fifteen years after the
Parliamentary Assembly's report, the number of separatist areas has
increased considerably in the territory of the Council of Europe: this
is the case for Northern Cyprus (Republic of Cyprus), Transnistria
(Republic of Moldova), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia
and South Ossetia (Georgia), and Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
(Ukraine).'
All of those separatist areas are different apropos the causes of the
underlying territorial conflict, the existence and intensity of armed
hostilities, and the diplomatic negotiations that have taken place.
However, the nature of the human rights violations presents certain
similarities. People living in the concerned areas are exposed to
"persistent vulnerability '  as a consequence of various factual
Ossetia" by four States (Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru; two other States,
Tuvalu and Vanuatu having granted, but subsequently withdrawn recognition), the
other de facto entities controlling separatist areas (the "Moldovan Republic of
Transnistria," the "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic," the "Donetsk people's republic"
and "Luhansk people's republic" or the "Republic of Crimea" as annexed to the
Russian Federation) are not recognised as States by any State.
6. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
Annex art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (providing the same
definition for "effective control" over a territory as used by the ECtHR); see also
Chiragov v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 96 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-155353 (demonstrating the ECtHR's use of the
same definition for "effective control" over a territory).
7. Thomas de Waal, Enhancing the EU's Engagement With Separatist
Territories, CARNEGIE EUR. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/
01/17/enhancing-eu-s-engagement-with-separatist-territories-pub-67694. While the
present paper does not analyse Kosovo as a separatist area due to its recognition by
about three-thirds of the UN member States as an independent State (115
recognitions through the end of 2017), and due to the fact that no single outside State
had effective control over the local administration, some reference will be made to
the period of its international administration where it was still universally recognised
as part of Serbia (2001-2008) but outside its effective control.
8. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep. on the Human
Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, 10 (Mar. 3,
2016) (referring to non-Russian communities living in Crimea); see Org. for Sec.
and Cooperation in Eur. [OSCE] High Comm'r on Nat'l Minorities [HCNM],
Human Rights Assessment Mission in Ukraine, 85, May 12, 2014.
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elements. First, reliable reports detail extensive and serious violations
committed against residents of those areas.' Second, authorities of the
territorial State are physically absent and unable to offer effective
remedies to the victims on the spot,° whereas individuals wishing to
turn to the defacto authorities must confront procedures that lack due
process and fair trial guarantees." In other words, domestic remedies
available in the separatist region are typically ineffective.2
Consequently, where individuals from separatist areas find no
domestic remedies, international mechanisms and the ECtHR operate
as a court of first instance.3 Among international human rights treaty
mechanisms, the ECtHR provides the most sophisticated and only
binding judicial remedy available in the above-mentioned separatist
areas, and thus constitutes the major procedural way to claim
reparation for past and ongoing human rights violations.
As a binding mechanism, the ECtHR has been seized by a mass of
applications related to all the above-mentioned areas. As of June 2017,
the number of pending applications from separatist areas are as
follows: 6 from Northern Cyprus, 12 from Abkhazia, 88 from
Transnistria, 1,951 from South Ossetia, 2,175 from Nagorno-
Karabakh, and 3,684 from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.4 The
9. See, e.g., Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep. on
Accountability for Killings in Ukraine: from January 2014 to May 2016, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/33/CRP.2 (2016).
10. See id. 58 (discussing the ineffective investigation initiated by authorities).
11. See id. 65 (noting the parallel "law enforcement" entities set up for the
"Donetsk people's republic" and the "Luhansk people's republic"); Office of the
U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep. on the Human Rights Situation in
Ukraine: 16 February to 15 May 2016, 172, 189-90 (June 6, 2016).
12. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep. on Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence in Ukraine, 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/CRP.4 (Mar. 16,
2017); EUR. PARL. Ass., Legal Remedies for Human Rights Violations on the
Ukrainian Territories Outside the Control of the Ukrainian Authorities, Doc. No.
14139, 7 (Oct. 12, 2016); Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Rep.
on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (May 15, 2014).
13. See Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 115-120
(2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-179555 (explaining that while the it is
not a court of first instance, "there may be special circumstances which absolve the
applicant from the obligation to exhaust the domestic remedies"); see also Chiragov
v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 115-120 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-00 1-155353.
14. Information received from the Registry of the ECtHR, June 28, 2017 (on file
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concurrent applications further increase the Court's caseload, which is
already overburdened by its backlog of pending cases and the annual
influx of new applications. Although between 2011 and 2017, the
Court managed to reduce its backlog of pending cases from 151,000
to 56,000,5 it has been less successful in handling the annual influx
that has continuously increased in recent years, with more than 63,000
applications allocated to a judicial formation in 2017.16 The challenge
posed by the increasing caseload stems partly from widespread
violations resulting from separatist conflicts with or without
continuing armed hostilities.17
Beyond a large number of applications, a complexity of applicants
also characterizes the ECtHR's pending cases. It suffices to refer to
the situation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, subject o five inter-state
applications submitted by Ukraine against Russia,8 or the Georgia v.
Russia (II) case,'9 concerning the August 2008 war in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Beyond the inter-state cases, more than 1,400
individual applications related to the events in Crimea or the hostilities
in Eastern Ukraine were submitted as of October 20152' and this
with the author).
15. See Eur. Ct. H.R., Annual Report 2011, 152 (2012),
https://www.echr.coe.intlDocuments/Annual report 2011_ENG.pdf; Eur. Ct. H.R.,
Annual Report 2017, 164 (2018), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual
report 2017_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Annual Report 2017].
16. See Annual Report 2017, supra note 15, at 168 (showing the case backlog
was 53,400 in 2016 and 40,500 in 2015); see also Eur. Ct. H.R., Annual Report
2016, 191 (2017), https://www.echr.coe.int!Documents/Annualreport_2016_ENG
.pdf (showing the case backlog was 53,500 in 2016 and 40,550 in 2015).
17. Council of Eur., Rep. of the Steering Comm. for Human Rights, The Longer-
Term Future of the System of the European Convention of Human Rights, 79
(2015) [hereinafter Longer-Term Future] (linking the high number of cases to
violence in separatist conflicts).
18. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber to
Examine Four Complaints by Ukraine Against Russia Over Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine, ECHR 173 (May 9, 2018).
19. See generally Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-108097.
20. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Human
Rights Communicates to Russia New Inter-State Case Concerning Events in Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine, ECHR 296 (Oct. 1, 2015), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
app/conversion/pdf/?library-ECHR&id-003-4945099-6056223&filename-003-
4945099-6056223.pdf [hereinafter ECtHR Press Release, Case Concerning Events
in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine].
2018]
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number may have since tripled.
While facing the difficult question of examining a high volume of
both individual and inter-state pending cases concerning the same
areas, the ECtHR shall deal with complex factual situations and take
into account various parallel procedures of international investigation
or settlement concerning the same separatist conflicts. Such parallel
proceedings include the mechanisms of the U.N. human rights
monitoring bodies, inter-state disputes before the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) (the already closed Georgia v. Russia or the pending
Ukraine v. Russia cases), situations the International Criminal Court
(ICC) has investigated,2 or pending investment arbitration claims
before arbitral tribunals. The international litigations and fact-finding
procedures all address human rights violations in the same separatist
areas, presenting various overlaps as to the factual and legal questions.
The complexity of disputes before the ECtHR and other
international dispute settlement bodies raise numerous procedural
questions in regard to the mechanisms of the ECtHR. The body of case
law concerning those areas can be called a set of "concurrent
applications"-namely parallel dispute settlement forums seized,
simultaneously acting applicants, and more than one respondent State
multiplying the pending applications concerning the same broader
factual background on the separatist conflict.22  "Concurrent
applications" are defined as applications filed with the ECtHR by
several individuals and/or a State or States concerning the same factual
context, and directed against one or several States, while a
substantially analogous matter has already been submitted to one or
more other procedures of international investigation or settlement.
This definition implies three types of concurring procedural elements:
1) concurrent dispute settlement forums (the ECtHR and other
21. See Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15, Decision on the Prosecutor's Request
for Authorization of an Investigation, 3 (Jan. 27, 2016) (granting the proprio motu
investigation of the situation in South Ossetia during the 2008 armed conflict); see
also Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities,
33-42 (Nov. 14, 2016) (discussing the preliminary examination of alleged crimes
committed on the territory of Ukraine).





CONCURRENT APPLICA TION BEFORE THE ECTHR
international adjudicative bodies), 2) concurrent applicants
(individuals and States), and 3) concurrent respondent States (two or
more States).
Concurrent applications are especially common from separatist
areas because the areas' specificities allow victims of human rights
violations to use multiple procedural possibilities to obtain remedies
for the same breaches of international law. One such specificity is the
international, or at least internationalized, character of the separatist
conflict. In all of the above-mentioned separatist areas, the armed
conflicts and subsequent territorial disputes broke out between the
territorial State and a separatist defacto entity,24 effectively controlled
or decisively influenced25 by another, outside State. This opens the
way to international dispute settlements between two States or
between private individuals and each or both of the concerned States.
In particular, disputes concerning human rights are likely to give rise
to procedures on the same or similar legal questions before diverse
concurrent dispute settlement fora-both judicial and quasi-judicial
24. De facto entities and de facto authorities are used as synonyms in the sense
of an entity that exercises at least some effective political authority over a territory
within a State without being recognized by the overwhelming majority of the
international community as an independent State or part of a State other than the
territorial State. See Jochen A. Frowein, De Facto Regime, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); see also Anthony Cullen
& Steven Wheatley, The Human Rights of Individuals in De Facto Regimes Under
the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 691, 694, 700
(2013); Michael Schoiswohl, De Facto Regimes and Human Rights Obligations -
The Twilight Zone of Public International Law, 6 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L.
45, 50-51 (2001).
25. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J.
Rep. 43, 391-95, 397 (Feb. 26); see also Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R.
179, 282 (showing that this test can be considered as an example of the attribution
under Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State responsibility); Loizidou v. Turkey, App.
No. 5318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-58007;
Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, App. No. 15318/89 Eur. Ct. H.R. 62
(1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-57920 (explaining that these notions
refer to a test used by the ECtHR to attribute the conduct of the defacto authorities
to the outside State); Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 40-42 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA]; Stefan
Talmon, The Responsibility of Outside Powers for Acts of Secessionist Entities, 58
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 508-11 (2009).
2018]
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bodies.26 A further specificity is the large scale of human rights
violations: the concurrence of various applicants' results from the
mass of human rights violations affecting both the territorial State and
many individual victims. Finally, another characteristic is the
complexity of the actors present in the separatist areas and
consequently that of responsibility, as the development of
international law has led to the engagement of the responsibility of
States,27 international organizations,28 individuals (international
criminal liability), 29 and potentially defacto entities." Thus, more than
one international subject might incur concurrent responsibility for the
same violation of international human rights law." The ECtHR case
law has recognized the possibility to find multiple States responsible
for their own wrongful acts in the same procedure, which gives rise to
new applications against concurrent respondent States.
26. Eur. Ct. H.R., Annual Report 2009, 44 (2010), https://www.echr.int!
Documents/Annual report_2009_ENG.pdf
27. ARSIWA, supra note 25, at 41 (examining how federal governments are
required to enforce international agreements in separate states).
28. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/66/10, at 52-172 (2011) (enumerating the responsibilities of international
organizations).
29. See, e.g., Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia art. 1 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 2009);
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (establishing an international criminal court); Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 1 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1994).
30. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 116 (June 27); Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.),
Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 105 (Feb. 3) (noting that the Court did not exclude
the possibility of an attribution under Article 10(2) of the ARSIWA: "Accordingly,
even if the acts prior to 27 April 1992 on which Croatia relies were attributable to a
'movement,' within the meaning of Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles"); ARSIWA,
supra note 25, at 52; Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. of Its Fiftieth Session, U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/53/10, at 59 (1998), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 51, 53, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1998/Add.1 (Part 2); Int'l Law
Comm'n, Rep. of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/51/10, at 59 (1996), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 59, U.N.
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1 996/Add. 1(Part 2).
31. ARSIWA, supra note 25, at 142-43 (discussing State responsibility and
individual responsibility); A1-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2001 -IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 80
(showing that the ECtHR impliedly recognized this possibility (dual responsibility
of an international organization and troop-contributing States)).
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Facing the proliferation of concurrent applications from separatist
areas, the ECtHR has to define its judicial strategy2 and prioritize
some of its often-competing goals. Scholarship often identifies the
competing goals as the delivery of individual justice and constitutional
justice. The basic concept of constitutional justice is that the Court
should only settle the most important applications, either because of
their gravity or because of the general and systemic importance of the
alleged human rights violation.3 With respect to individual justice, it
is widely defined as the Court's ultimate goal, namely to remedy
individual grievances under Article 34 on the right to individual
application.4 Notwithstanding the huge backlog of cases, States
parties" and the Court36 have constantly reaffirmed their commitment
32. Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, 12
CHI. J. INT'L L. 115, 117 (2011) (using the notion of "judicial strategy" in the sense
of the Court's principled decision to act in a certain manner in questions where it
has discretion).
33. Its proponents are, among others, the Court's former President and Registrar,
respectively. See Steven Greer & Luzius Wildhaber, Revisiting the Debate About
"Constitutionalising" the European Court of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
655, 671 (2012); see also Luzius Wildhaber, The European Court of Human Rights
in Action, RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 83, 91 (2004); Paul Mahoney, New Challenges for
the European Court of Human Rights Resulting from the Expanding Case Load and
Membership, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 101, 105 (2002); Rudolf Bernhardt, The
Admissibility Stage: The Pros and Cons of a Certiorari Procedure for Individual
Applications, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY
APPLICATIONS: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP,
HEIDELBERG 34 (Riidiger Wolfrum and Ulrike Deutsch eds., 2009); Comm. of
Ministers, Rep. of the Evaluation Group to Examine Possible Means of
Guaranteeing the Effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights, Doc. EG
Court(2001) 1, 98 (2001) [hereinafter Rep. of Evaluation Group].
34. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 34, supra note 2; Marie-
Benedicte Dembour, "Finishing Off' Cases: The Radical Solution to the Problem
ofExpanding ECtHR Caseload, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 604, 621 (2002).
35. High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human
Rights, Draft Copenhagen Declaration, 1 (Feb. 5, 2018), https://menneskeret.dkl
sites/menneskeret.dkfiles/media/dokumenter/nyheder/draft copenhagen declarati
on_05.02.18.pdf [hereinafter Draft Copenhagen Declaration] (reaffirming State
Parties' commitment to the protection of human rights); High Level Conference on
the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, 2 (Apr.
19, 2012) [hereinafter Brighton Declaration]; High Level Conference on the Future
of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, 1 (Feb. 10, 2010)
[hereinafter Interlaken Declaration].
36. Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 122 ("[A] key component of
the machinery for protecting the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.");
2018]
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to individual justice "as a cornerstone of the Convention system."3
Regarding concurrent applications from separatist areas, the Court has
declared that the thousands of applications from the conflict areas of
Ukraine "will not be put on hold and will continue to be processed on
a case by case basis."38
Despite the Court's commitment to examine each application from
separatist areas, some scholars doubt whether individual justice is
feasible in the case of gross and systematic human rights violations.9
More importantly, the Draft Copenhagen Declaration on the European
Convention on Human Rights system recently presented by the Danish
Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers also expressed the
intention to create "separate mechanisms or other means" to deal with
those concurrent applications.4" While the final version of the
Copenhagen Declaration did not include the clause, the proposal is a
sign of some States' willingness to further constitutionalize the
settlement of concurrent applications from separatist areas,
considering the challenge they pose to the ECHR system that the
Copenhagen Declaration and the ECtHR itself recognized.4' Few such
"separate mechanisms" had been discussed in the past: some proposed
Eur. Ct. H.R., Annual Report 2013,27 (2014), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Annual report_2013_ENG.pdf (affirming the commitment of the Court to the
protection of individual human rights).
37. See, e.g., Draft Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 35, 1, 48.
38. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Complaints Concerning
Shelling of Homes in Eastern Ukraine Declared Inadmissible Due to Lack of
Evidence, ECHR 263 (July 28, 2016).
39. Hans-Joachim Heintze, The European Court of Human Rights and the
Implementation of Human Rights Standards During Armed Conflicts, 45 GER. Y.B.
INT'L L. 60, 77 (2002); Kerem Altiparmak, Turkish Cases Relating to Terrorism
Before the European Court of Human Rights: Procedural Issues, 5 J. C.L. 30, 48
(2000); Menno T. Kamminga, Is the European Convention on Human Rights
Sufficiently Equipped to Cope with Gross and Systematic Violations?, 12 NETH. Q.
HUM. RTS. 153, 153 (1994).
40. Draft Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 35, 54(b) (inviting the
Committee of Ministers to consider "the establishment of separate mechanisms or
other means to deal with inter-State cases as well as individual communications
stemming from a conflict between two or more States Parties").
41. High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human
Rights, Copenhagen Declaration, Comm. of Ministers, 45 (2018) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Declaration]; Opinion on the Draft Copenhagen Declaration, Comm.
of Ministers, 26 (Feb. 19, 2018).
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to reduce the massive number of applications of victims of armed
conflicts by the transformation of the Commissioner for Human
Rights into a Public Prosecutor attached to the Court and/or the
introduction of an actio popularis,42 or by extension of the powers of
the Commissioner for Human Rights at the national level in
conjunction with national ombudsmen,43 or by setting-up a fact-
finding mechanism as a chamber of the Court or outside the ECtHR.44
Yet, none of those mechanisms have been considered as a real
alternative to the ECtHR and none have been institutionalized.
Furthermore, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rejected the
recent proposal to create "separate mechanisms or other means" to
settle concurrent applications from separatist conflicts, regarding it as
an attempt to "displace such cases from the judicial to the political
level" and a threat to the right to individual application.45 Likewise,
academic critics underlined46 that the proposal would remove from the
Court's jurisdiction concurrent applications from separatist areas in
contradiction to the Convention stipulation that its provisions continue
to apply in situations of "war or other public emergency'47 and the
opinion of the Steering Committee for Human Rights under which
42. Doc. 9730, supra note 1, 59; EUR. PARL. Ass., Areas Where the European
Convention on Human Rights Cannot be Implemented, Rec. 1606, 10(b)-(c)
(2003).
43. Rep. of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, Minister's
Deputies, 109-13, Doc. No. CM(2006)203 (2006).
44. Final Activity Report on the Protection of Human Rights During Armed
Conflict as Well as During Internal Disturbances and Tensions, Rep. of the Steering
Comm. for Human Rights, 7-11, Doc. No. CM(2003)165-AddII (2004) (referring
to the proposal of a consultant study).
45. Joint NGO Response to the Draft Copenhagen Declaration, AMNESTY INT'L
10 (2018), https://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/JointNGO_Response
ToTheCopenhagenDeclaration-i 3_February_2018.pdf
46. Alice Donald & Philip Leach, Copenhagen: Keeping on Keeping on. A Reply
to Mikael Rask Madsen and Jonas Christoffersen on the Draft Copenhagen
Declaration, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/copenhagen-
keeping-on-keeping-on-a-reply-to-mikael-rask-madsen-and-jonas-christoffersen-
on-the-draft-copenhagen-declaration/ [hereinafter Donald & Leach, Copenhagen:
Keeping on Keeping on]; Alice Donald & Philip Leach, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing:
Why the Draft Copenhagen Declaration Must Be Rewritten, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 21,
2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-wolf-in-sheeps-clothing-why-the-draft-
copenhagen-declaration-must-be-rewritten#more-15927 [hereinafter Donald &
Leach, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing].
47. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(1), supra note 2.
2018]
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"[t]he Court has a pivotal role" in examining large-scale violations.48
Its defenders, however, emphasized that the Draft Copenhagen
Declaration does not suggest he striking of the pending cases out of
the list of the Court "but rather it calls for rethinking how justice can
better be served in those difficult circumstances.
'" 49
The present paper submits that the settlement of concurrent
applications from separatist areas is feasible through the strategic use
of existing procedural tools of the ECtHR without introducing a
separate mechanism or further constitutionalizing the Convention to
the detriment of individual justice. The Court should settle such
concurrent applications in a coordinated way, taking into account the
interconnected legal and factual background as well as procedural and
substantive law questions of concurrent cases in individual
procedures. Each case having its own factual specificities, the broader
context and legal background make the concurrent applications
interconnected. Taking into account concurrent applications
originating from the same factual and legal context does not impair the
Court's function to provide individual justice, as far as particular
circumstances of each case are duly examined, while promoting the
Court's other function-the so-called constitutional justice-by
remedying gross and systematic violations. As this paper will
illustrate, the separatist conflicts in Europe have led to a series of
concurrent applications that the Court has decided in various ways and
using several procedural tools, to make effective the human rights
enshrined in the Convention. The similar procedural steps and
conclusions on substantive law show that the Court does not consider
those applications isolated from each other, but strives to settle them
in a coordinated way, taking into account the related procedural and
substantive law issues.
Part II defines the method and principles of coordinated treatment
that this paper purports to advocate as the most efficient case-
management practice to settle concurrent applications. As the
48. Longer-Term Future, supra note 17, 88.
49. Mikael R. Madsen & Jonas Christoffersen, The European Court of Human




CONCURRENT APPLICA TION BEFORE THE ECTHR
subsequent parts explain, the method of coordinated settlement is a
particularly welcome technique in the pending concurrent applications
from separatist regions. Part III scrutinizes the various international
dispute settlement mechanisms that States or individuals have seized
from separatist areas simultaneously in parallel with their application
to the ECtHR. The precedents clarify that the parallel pending
procedures of international investigation or settlement do not
necessarily constitute a ground for inadmissibility before the ECtHR
under the lis pendens rule and that they can strengthen the effective
settlement of the ECHR applications. Supposing that the case is
admissible, Part IV will elucidate how the Court has to coordinate
effectively between the applications of numerous concurrent
individuals and/or a State regarding the same factual context and legal
problems. Various procedural tools allow the Court to group
concurrent applications or prioritize one of them, while facilitating the
further settlement of others. Part V explains how the Court should
coordinate the treatment of applications against concurrent respondent
States, especially the territorial State and an outside State. The
precedents and the underlying international character of the separatist
conflicts indicate that the Court should coordinate between States by
designating a co-respondent proprio motu, by deciding on the
reparation duties of co-respondents, and by inviting third-party
interventions of States factually linked to the underlying separatist
conflict. Part VI concludes with recommending the most effective
settlement for concurrent applications to the Court. Those
recommendations intend to contribute to three ongoing academic
debates: 1) the question of the appropriateness of the ECtHR to
supervise international human rights law in armed conflicts," 2) the
ongoing Copenhagen reform process of the ECtHR,5' and 3) the
broader question of the proliferation of competing jurisdictions in
international adjudication.1
2
50. See, e.g., Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, The European Court of Human Rights
at a Time of Crisis in Europe, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 121, 130-34 (2016); Heintze,
supra note 39; Kamminga, supra note 38.
51. See, e.g., Donald & Leach, Copenhagen: Keeping on Keeping on, supra note
46; Donald & Leach, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, supra note 46; Mikael R. Madsen,
Rebalancing European Human Rights: Has the Brighton Declaration Engendered a
New Deal on Human Rights in Europe?, J. INT'L DIsP. SETTLEMENT 1 (2017).
52. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge E. Vifiuales, The Challenge of
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II. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COORDINATED
SETTLEMENT OF CONCURRENT APPLICATIONS
Under "coordinated settlement", the present paper understands a
principled treatment of interconnected applications, in accordance
with a judicial strategy developed to address the massive influx of
applications and as opposed to the isolated settlement of an individual
case without due regard to other cases. This latter concept would be
an extreme interpretation of individual justice, requiring the traditional
case-by-case adjudication of each application notwithstanding to other
applications. However, the Court's judicial strategy and case
management has considerably evolved from this simplistic reading to
a coordinated method or "systemic approach"53 of case management,
where it uses a "range of procedural tools to solve a large number of
applications resulting from systemic issues."54 In other words, rather
than focusing merely on the individual case at hand, the Court will
settle procedural and substantive law issues raised in the application
by linking them to other concurrent applications.
The coordinated method ensures the coherence of the case law and
the effectiveness of the Court and the Convention. "Effectiveness" of
the Court is understood as goal-based judicial performance; "the
degree to which international courts meet the expectations of relevant
constituencies", especially of their mandate providers.5 The goals of
the ECtHR set in its mandate (the 1949 Statute of the CoE, the travaux
pr~paratoires of the ECHR and to the process of drafting the Statute,
the Protocols and CoE documents on the reform of the ECtHR) are
norm support, dispute settlement, regime support, and legitimation.6
This Part will explain that the coordinated settlement of the mass of
"Proliferation: An Anatomy of the Debate, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 136 (Cesare Romano et al. eds., 2014); YUVAL
SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 8 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2003); Christoph H. Schreuer, Concurrent
Jurisdiction of National and International Tribunals, 13 HOUS. L. REV. 508, 508
(1976).
53. Longer-Term Future, supra note 17, 89 (noting that the Court's policy has
transitioned to a "problem-oriented approach" instead of a case-by-case approach).
54. Id.
55. YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
8 (MacKenzie et al. eds., 2014).
56. Id. at 6.
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applications from separatist areas serves all of those goals of the Court,
while strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention.
The coordinated method of dispute settlement shall comply with
some procedural and substantive law principles that the Court has
elaborated in its case law: the effectiveness of the Convention (Part
II.A), subsidiarity (Part II.B), good administration of justice and
procedural economy (Part II.C), and the coherent and harmonious
interpretation of the Convention (Part II.D). This Part will explain that
while deciding on individual cases, the Court should ease its fact-
finding and legal analytical burden by applying these principles.
A. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION
The notion of effectiveness of the Convention is often used by the
Court as a "long established principle" under which "the Convention
is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective, and not
theoretical and illusory."5 It also refers to the guarantee of the
implementation of Article 34 of the Convention on the right to
individual petition: the Court shall be "in a position to process
applications within a reasonable time, while maintaining the quality
and authority of its judgments."58 Effectiveness of the ECtHR is
closely related to the other above-mentioned principles: it is
"contingent on the quality, cogency and consistency of the Court's
judgments."59
The massive number of applications, especially the simultaneous
submission of concurrent applications from separatist areas presents a
challenge for the effectiveness of the Convention, because the more
annual influx overburdens the Court, the longer the time lapse between
submitting an application to the Court and getting a judgment
(commonly referred to as the "Brighton backlog").6" Beyond the
57. Khlebik v. Ukraine, App. No. 2945/16, Eur. Ct. H.R. 71 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-002-11601; Artico v. Italy, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.)
33 (1980).
58. EUR. PARL. Ass., Guaranteeing the Authority and Effectiveness of the
European Convention of Human Rights, Res. 1856, 2 (2012).
59. Longer-Term Future, supra note 17, 96.
60. Burmych v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 46852/13 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 150 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-178082; EUR. PARL. Ass., The Effectiveness of
the European Convention on Human Rights: The Brighton Declaration and Beyond,
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Convention's effectiveness, the huge backlog of cases and the rise of
the annual influx both risk compromising "the quality and the
consistency of the case-law and the authority of the Court."'"
Paradoxically, the saying "the Court became a victim of its own
success"62 has become increasingly true over the last three decades.
The effectiveness of the recourse to the Court provokes its own
paralysis as individuals increasingly file their applications with the
Court. However, the other principles allow some procedural tools that
decrease the Court's adjudicative burden to provide individualized
decision: subsidiarity, good administration of justice and procedural
economy, and the coherent and harmonious interpretation of the
Convention.63 As the next Parts will explain, the Court can both act
under those principles and ensure the effectiveness of the Convention
if it takes due account of the specific facts and circumstances of each
individual case.
B. SUBSIDIARITY
The principle of subsidiarity protects the primary role and relative
autonomy of national courts to settle disputes, "by applying
international obligations in a specific factual and (national) legal
context."64 Scholars commonly use "subsidiarity" to refer to "the
relationship between certain international human rights treaties and
domestic law."65 The principle is reflected in human rights treaty
Doc. 13719, 15 (2015) [hereinafter Doc. 13719] (recognizing that the massive
influx of applications "is liable to affect the Court's ability to fulfil its mission under
Article 19 in relation to other meritorious applications warranting examination").
61. Interlaken Declaration, supra note 35, 8.
62. The ECHR in 50 Questions, ECHR 11 (Feb. 2014), https://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/50QuestionsENG.pdf; Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European
Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the
European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125, 126 (2008); Lynne
Turnbull, Victim of Its Own Success: The Reform of the European Court of Human
Rights, 1 EUR. PUB. L. 215 (1995).
63. Helfer, supra note 62.
64. Andr6 Nollkaemper, Conversations Among Courts: Domestic and
International Adjudicators, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION 527 (Cesare Romano et al. eds., 2014); Paolo G. Carozza,
Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 38, 67 (2003).
65. Carozza, supra note 64, at 39 n.7.
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articles providing that nothing in the treaty shall limit or restrict rights
and freedoms guaranteed under the domestic law of the State parties.66
Another practical manifestation of the principle is the exhaustion of
domestic remedies as a condition of admissibility before international
human rights courts.6
Regarding the ECHR, the mechanism of the Convention is
"subsidiary to the safeguarding of human rights at national level and
that national authorities are in principle better placed than an
international court to evaluate local needs and conditions."68 The
Court's early case law69 elaborated upon this principle and the States
parties70 reiterated it as a solution to the increasing number of pending
66. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 4(4),
Dec. 13, 2006, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106; African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 1(2), O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered
into force Nov. 29, 1999); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women art. 13, June 9, 1994, 35
I.L.M. 1534; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; American
Convention on Human Rights art. 29(b), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter Pact of San Jose];
European Convention on Human Rights art. 53, supra note 2.
67. Solomon T. Ebobrah, International Human Rights Courts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 241 (Cesare Romano et al. eds.,
2014).
68. Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECHR 9,
https://www. echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_15_explanatoryreportENG.pdf
(last visited June 29, 2018) [hereinafter Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 15].
69. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. 48
(1976), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-57499 ("Nevertheless, it is for the
national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social
need implied by the notion of 'necessity' in this context."); see also Case "Relating
to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the use of Languages in Education i Belgium,"
3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) 10 (1967), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-57525
("[T]he Court cannot disregard those legal and factual features which characterise
the life of the society in the State which, as a Contracting Party, has to answer for
the measure in dispute. In so doing it cannot assume the role of the competent
national authorities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the
international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention.
The national authorities remain free to choose the measures which they consider
appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention.").
70. See Recommendation Rec(2004)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on the Improvement of Domestic Remedies, COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM. OF
MINISTERS, 13 (May 12, 2004), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result-details.aspx
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cases. States parties foresaw to amend the ECHR with a preambular
paragraph providing that "High Contracting Parties, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to
secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the
Protocols thereto."
With regard to concurrent applications specifically, subsidiarity is
the key consideration when the Court coordinates between similar
cases and settles one prioritized case, while leaving the settlement of
the other cases to domestic authorities. Procedural tools like the pilot
judgment or leading cases72 promote subsidiarity, as far as the
respondent State is able and willing to cooperate and set up effective
domestic remedies. As an exception to the subsidiarity rule, the Court
does not require the exhaustion of domestic remedies when
unavailable or effective, which has been the case in most human rights
disputes submitted from separatist areas. In those cases, the Court
operates as a "court of first instance,"'7 turning the subsidiary nature
?ObjectID-09000016805ddl 8e ("When a judgment which points to structural or
general deficiencies in national law or practice ('pilot case') has been delivered and
a large number of applications to the Court concerning the same problem ('repetitive
cases') are pending or likely to be lodged, the respondent state should ensure that
potential applicants have, where appropriate, an effective remedy allowing them to
apply to a competent national authority, which may also apply to current applicants.
Such a rapid and effective remedy would enable them to obtain redress at national
level, in line with the principle of subsidiarity of the Convention system."); see also
Brighton Declaration, supra note 35, 11 ("The jurisprudence of the Court makes
clear that the States Parties enjoy a margin of appreciation in how they apply and
implement the Convention, depending on the circumstances of the case and the
rights and freedoms engaged. This reflects that the Convention system is subsidiary
to the safeguarding of human rights at national level and that national authorities are
in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and
conditions... [T]he role of the Court is to review whether decisions taken by
national authorities are compatible with the Convention, having due regard to the
State's margin of appreciation.").
71. Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 15 art. 1, supra note 68.
72. See infra Section IV.B.2.
73. See Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, ECHR 72, (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibilityguide ENG.pdf (stating that
applicants are only required to exhaust domestic remedies when those remedies are
accessible and capable of providing a reasonable remedy to their complaint).
74. Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 32-33 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-179555 (explaining that because the
Government failed to comply with its commitments and obligations under the
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of the ECHR mechanism "on its head."'7
However, where the Court found a domestic remedy effective and
available, it required the exhaustion rule and reaffirmed its ultimate
supervisory jurisdiction.76 This was the case with the domestic remedy
that the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) created to
settle the mass of disputes of expropriated Greek Cypriot owners77 and
that of the Ukrainian courts relocated from the separatist areas to
government controlled territories.78 The Court considered both of
those domestic procedures as effective remedies to be exhausted
before seizing the Convention mechanism, in accordance with the
subsidiarity principle.7' Therefore, the Court shall examine on a case-
by-case basis whether subsidiarity can be invoked in the given
separatist area, as a huge number of applications can be redirected to
domestic remedies if effective and available.
C. GOOD ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL
ECONOMY
Two closely related principles, good administration of justice and
procedural economy, help the ECtHR to rationalize its procedure
while dealing with concurrent applications. First, good administration
of justice is a principle that enables courts to fill gaps in the regulation
Convention the Court must act as the court of first instance); Chiragov v. Armenia,
App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 118-20 (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?
i-001-155353 (stating that the respondent Government failed to show a remedy
capable of resolving the applicants' complaints, so the Court dismissed the
Government's objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and then
proceeded to hear the case).
75. Paul Mahoney, Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European Court
of Human Rights, 20 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1, 4 (1999) ("The subsidiary character of the
ECHR has been turned on its head, the ECHR institutions do not have the benefit of
fact-finding and an initial assessment by the domestic courts, and the new Court runs
the risk of being swamped with work for which it is not presently equipped.").
76. See Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 415 (affirming that
applicants who have exhausted all available paths in pursuit of a remedy may invoke
their rights under the Convention and the Court will have ultimate supervisory
jurisdiction).
77. See id. at 407; see also Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46347/99 et
al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-71800.
78. See Tsezar v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 73590/14 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 69-71
(2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-180845.
79. See id T 69.
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of their procedures. When the statute or the rules of procedure of a
given tribunal do not address a given scenario, any international
tribunal is "at liberty to adopt the principle which it considers best
calculated to ensure the administration of justice, most suited to
procedure before an international tribunal and most in conformity with
the fundamental principles of international law."8 The principle of
good administration of justice allows international tribunals, due to
their "inherent power,"'" "to mitigate the rigid application of the rule
of procedure or to solve an issue of procedure which is not regulated
by specific rules" of procedure.82 The ICJ invoked the standard of good
administration of justice to disregard the applicant's initial lack of
capacity to seize the Court if the applicant's deficiency might be
overcome in the course of proceedings,83 to rule on the respective
claims and counter-claims of the parties in a single set of
proceedings,84 to order the joinder of preliminary objections to the
merits,85 or in the "interest of the applicant to have its claims decided
80. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, 1924
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 2, at 16 (Aug. 30).
81. See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa
Rica v. Nicar.), Joinder of Proceedings, 2013 I.C.J. Rep. 177, 14 (Apr. 17)
(separate opinion by Trindade, J.) ("In my understanding, the Court did not do so
pursuant to an 'implied power' ensuing from the regulatory texts, but rather, and
more precisely, pursuant o an 'inherent power,' proper to the exercise of the
international judicial function. It is an 'inherent power' of the international tribunal
concerned to see to it that the procedure functions properly, so that justice is done
and is seen to be done. It is an 'inherent power' of an international tribunal such as
the ICJ to see to it that the procedure operates in a balanced way, ensuring procedural
equality and the guarantees of due process, so as to preserve the integrity of its
judicial function.").
82. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2008 I.C.J.
Rep. 590, 91 (dissenting opinion of Kreda, J.).
83. Seeid. at441, 85.
84. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Counter-Claim, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 205, 43
(Mar. 10); see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, 1997
I.C.J. Rep. 257-58, 30-31 (Dec. 17).
85. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belg. v. Spain),
Preliminary Objections, 1964 I.C.J. Rep. at 42 (July 24); see also Panevezys-
Saldutiskis Railway Case (Est. v. Lith.), Preliminary Objections, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 75, at 56 (June 30) ("Whereas the Court may order the joinder of
preliminary objections to the merits, whenever the interests of the good
administration of justice require it.").
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within a reasonable period of time."86 This principle serves the
adequate functioning of the procedure, so that the international
tribunal can be in possession of all elements necessary for the decision
in good time and be able to deal with the "totality of a dispute."8
The ECtHR invokes the "proper administration of justice" for
instance to order the simultaneous examination of applications by the
same formation of the Court,88 to join applications in one procedure,89
to examine an adjourned application within the pilot-judgment
procedure,9" or to invite the third party intervention of a State or any
person who is not a party to the proceedings.9' In those examples, the
ECtHR uses its judicial discretion to assess the degree of
connectedness between claims, cases, or parties and integrates those
connected elements accordingly in its procedure. Thus, where the
Court translates interconnected substantial law questions into its
procedure, it promotes the adequate functioning of its mechanism and
develops the coordinated settlement of disputes.
Second, the ICJ interprets "judicial economy" as "an element of the
requirements of the sound administration of justice" which aims "to
prevent the needless proliferation of proceedings.92 The principle of
judicial economy grants the courts discretion to simplify their
procedure. Judicial economy allows tribunals "to refrain from
86. See Iran v. U.S., Counter-Claim, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. at 205, 43.
87. See id.; see also ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1130-31 (2013).
88. Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights art. 35(2) (1959)
[hereinafter ECtHR Rules 1959].
89. See Varga v. Hungary, App. Nos. 14097/12 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-152784; see also Association "21 December
1989" v. Romania, App. No. 33810/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 7 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-104864; Atanasiu v. Romania, App. Nos.
30767/05, 33800/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 108 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i-001-100989.
90. See Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights art. 61(6)(c)
(2018) [hereinafter ECtHR Rules 2018].
91. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 36(2), supra note 2; see also
ECtHR Rules 2018 art. 44(3)(a), supra note 90; Avoting v. Latvia, App. No.
17502/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-163114.
92. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2008 I.C.J.
Rep. 442-43, 89 (dissenting opinion of Kreda, J.).
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addressing claims beyond those necessary to resolve the dispute," but
it does not compel them to exercise such restraint.93
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) applied the
principle of judicial economy to preliminary objections for the first
time in international case law. The Court concluded that a procedural
defect is curable by subsequent action of the applicant or respondent
in view of considerations of judicial economy.94 The ICJ similarly
confirmed that judicial economy provided a justification for
disregarding jurisdictional defects, if they could be easily cured by the
subsequent action of the applicant or respondent.95 It also invoked
procedural economy to decide on any preliminary objections-for
example, jurisdiction or admissibility-before entering into lengthy
and costly proceedings on the merits of a case,96 or to exercise its
power to join proceedings.9 Other international tribunals used judicial
economy as a principle allowing them to exercise discretion to decide
not to examine alternative claims if unnecessary for the dispute
93. See Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of
Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, 133, WTO Doc. WT/DS276/AB/R
(adopted Aug. 30, 2004); see also Appellate Body Report, United States -Imposition
of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel
Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 71, WTO Doc. WT/DS138/AB/R
(adopted May 10, 2000).
94. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment, 1924
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 2, at 17 (Aug. 30).
95. See Croat. v. Serb., Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 441,
89.
96. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 47, 49-50 (joint declaration of
Bedjaoui, J., Guillaume, J., and Ranjeva, J.) ("When the Court, in 1972, adopted the
text which later became Article 79, it did so for reasons of procedural economy and
of sound administration of justice. Court and parties were called upon to clear away
preliminary questions of jurisdiction and admissibility as well as other preliminary
objections before entering into lengthy and costly proceedings on the merits of a
case... The interpretation given by the Court in the present case to the notion 'not
exclusively preliminary character' is, however, so wide and so vague that the
possibility of accepting a preliminary objection becomes seriously restricted.
Thereby the Judgment acts counter to the procedural economy and the sound
administration of justice which it is the intent of Article 79 to achieve.").
97. See Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar.
v. Costa Rica), Joinder of Proceedings, 2013 I.C.J. Rep. 184 TT 12, 18 (Apr. 17).
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settlement;98 to decline "to disrupt the reasonable factual and legal
findings of the initial decision-maker in order to promote efficiency in
the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings;"99 or to determine the logical
order in which a court or tribunal considers the various issues before
it.0
0
Human rights courts found that certain domestic norms providing
on the connectivity of different cases in one procedure served the
legitimate purpose of procedural economy.1 1 For example the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) held the Venezuelan
"principle of connection", which combined the prosecution of several
perpetrators of a crime or several interconnected punishable acts in the
hands of the same court, as conforming to procedural economy and the
right to be tried by a competent tribunal.0 2 Likewise, the ECtHR held
it reasonable for the purposes of procedural economy that a high court
joined different sets of proceedings so that they may be disposed of
98. See Appellate Body Report, United States -Definitive Safeguard Measures
on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, 183, WTO Doc.
WT/DS166/AB/R (adopted Dec. 22, 2000); see also Appellate Body Report,
Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 399 10.219, WTO
Does. WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (adopted May 31, 2000).
99. Government of Sudan v. Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, 30
R.I.A.A. 145, 307-08, 422, http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol XXX/145-416.pdf.
100. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment,
2002 I.C.J. Rep. 19, 45-46; see also Iran v. U.S., 35 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. No. 823,
Award No. 595-823-3 of 16 Nov. 1999; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company (Belg. v. Spain), Preliminary Objections, 1964 I.C.J. Rep. at 85, 96-99
(July 24) (dissenting opinion by Morelli, J.).
101. See Bikas v. Germany, App. No. 76607/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 60 (2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-180316; see also Avoting v. Latvia, App. No.
17502/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 118 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-163114;
Kuhlen-Rafsandjani v. Germany, App. Nos. 21980/06 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 82, 85
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-102918; Matter of Certain Venezuelan
Prisons, Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (July 6, 2011),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/centrospenitenciarios se 01 ing5.pdf;
Matter of the Ciudad Bolivar Judicial Detention Center "Vista Hermosa Prison,"
Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (May 15, 2011),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/vistahermosa e 01 ing.pdf; Leiva v.
Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 206 (Nov. 17, 2009); Petersen v. Denmark, App. No. 6315/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.
8, 9 (2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-23918; Sissmann v. Germany,
1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 56-57.
102. See Leiva v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 2009
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 206, TT 74, 80.
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together, or coordinated them for purposes of disposal.0 3 The ECtHR
further held that in some cases, a domestic high court might leave
some applications pending and "await further constitutional
complaints in order to rule on them together for reasons of procedural
economy ... for example where a leading decision is sought.""'4 It
also found useful for procedural economy a law authorizing the
domestic courts to take into account in the sentencing process further
similar and closely-linked criminal acts0 5 or the joinder of criminal
trials of several accused whose roles were closely interconnected.0 6 In
their own procedure, regional human rights tribunals also justified
with judicial economy the joinder of cases or proceedings on
provisional measures,1' the rule on exhaustion of domestic
remedies,108 or the lack of examination of a specific complaint "either
where the judgment has dealt with the main legal issue or where the
complaints coincide or overlap."'19 Therefore, in accordance with the
ICJ's approach, the ECtHR should act under the principle of judicial
economy so as to prevent the needless proliferation of proceedings.
D. COHERENT AND HARMONIOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONVENTION
While interpreting a provision of the Convention, the Court must
try to achieve "an internal and external harmony, namely, respectively,
harmony within the Convention, reading it as a whole, and harmony
with the rules of international law." 110
103. See Case C-194/99 P, Thyssen Stahl AG v. Comm'n of the E.C., Opinion of
Advocate-General Stix-Hackl, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10821 243; see also Silssmann v.
Germany, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 56, 59.
104. See Kuhlen-Rafsandjani, App. Nos. 21980/06 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 82, 85.
105. See Bikas, App. No. 76607/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 60.
106. See Petersen, App. No. 6315/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8-9.
107. See Matter of Certain Venezuelan Prisons, Provisional Measures, Order of
the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 23 (July 6, 2011), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/
medidas/centrospenitenciarios e_01_ing.pdf; see also Matter of the Ciudad
Bolivar Judicial Detention Center "Vista Hermosa Prison," Provisional Measures,
Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 19 (May 15, 2011),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/vistahermosa e_01 ing.pdf.
108. See Avoting v. Latvia, App. No. 17502/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 118 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.inteng?i-001-163114.
109. See Catanv. Moldova, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, 374, 1.
110. Guizelyurtlu v. Cyprus, App. No. 36925/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. T 61 (2017)
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The first level where the coherent and harmonious interpretation of
the ECHR operates is in the Court's own case law as a whole. Beyond
the Convention's reference to undesired inconsistency of its
interpretation,"' both the ECtHR" 2 and States parties to the ECHR"13
highlight the importance of the clarity and consistency of the Court's
case law. It means that comparable cases shall be "resolved in the light
of the same principles" developed by the Court"4 and under
consistently applied procedural rules."5 On the one hand, the coherent
and harmonious interpretation of the provisions of the ECHR provides
legal certainty. The Court and States parties recognized that "[w]hile
the Court is not formally bound to follow any of its previous
judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and
(dissenting opinion of Serghides, J.), http://hudoc.echr.coe.inteng?i-001-172460;
see also Annual Report 2017, supra note 15, at 25 ("[T]he Court's approach being
to read the Convention as a whole so as to ensure the coherent and harmonious
interpretation of its provisions.").
111. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 30, supra note 2 ("Where a
case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the interpretation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, or where the resolution of a question
before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously
delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, at any time before it has rendered its
judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, unless one of the
parties to the case objects.").
112. See Buishvili v. Czech Republic, App. No. 30241/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. 44
(2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-114051 (stating that the Court noted a
consistent interpretation was required between Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and
Article 5 § 3, as both share a close affinity); see also Stec v. United Kingdom, 2005-
X Eur. Ct. H.R. 321, 340-41.
113. See Brighton Declaration, supra note 35, 12(c)(ii) ("The Conference ...
[w]elcomes and encourages open dialogues between the Court and States Parties as
a means of developing an enhanced understanding of their respective roles in
carrying out their shared responsibility for applying the Convention, including
particularly dialogues between the Court and... [t]he Committee of Ministers,
including on the principle of subsidiarity and on the clarity and consistency of the
Court's case law."); see also Interlaken Declaration, supra note 35, 4; ("[The
Conference] [s]tresses the importance of ensuring the clarity and consistency of the
Court's case-law and calls, in particular, for a uniform and rigorous application of
the criteria concerning admissibility and the Court's jurisdiction."); EUR. PARL.
Ass., Effective Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights: The
Interlaken Process, Res. 1726, 7 (2010).
114. See De Souza Ribeiro v. France, 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, 256 (concurring
opinion of De Albuquerque, J., joined by Vu~ini, J.).
115. See Burmych v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 46852/13 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 213
(2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.intleng?i-001-178082.
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equality before the law that it should not depart, without cogent reason,
from precedents laid down in previous cases.""' 6 As Part III will
explain, procedural tools like pilot judgments, leading cases, or Grand
Chamber judgments promote legal certainty by a well-settled case law.
On the other hand, consistency of the Convention's interpretation
does not exclude that the Court deviates from an established case law
in light of the specific circumstances of a case. In the context of
domestic courts, the ECtHR recognized that "the principle of good
administration of justice cannot be taken to impose a strict
requirement of case-law consistency."' " The same principle applies to
the ECtHR too: case law development is not, in itself, contrary to the
proper administration ofjustice. The Court shall follow a dynamic and
evolutive approach while interpreting the Convention as a "living
instrument," in light of present-day conditions."8
A second level of the coherent and harmonious interpretation of the
Convention operates between the ECHR and other international legal
regimes. The Court recognized at various occasions that the
Convention shall so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with
other obligations of the State parties under general international law"9
or special treaty regimes such as European Union law,2 ' the law of the
116. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), App. No. 10249/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 104 (2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-94135 (confirmed by the States parties in
paragraph 25(c) of the Brighton Declaration); see also Stafford v. United Kingdom,
2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 115, 137, 68; Chapman v. United Kingdom, 2001-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 41, 66, 70; Brighton Declaration, supra note 35, 25(c).
117. See $ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 13279/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 84 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-107156; see also Atanasovski v. Macedonia,
App. No. 36815/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 38 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
96673; Unddic v. France, App. No. 20153/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-90350.
118. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 71 (1995); Tyrer v.
United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) 31 (1978).
119. See Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 138 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-164515; see also Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V
Eur. Ct. H.R. 213,272, 170; Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
61, 128; Streletz v. Germany 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 409, 447; Al-Adsani v. United
Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 100.
120. See Annual Report 2017, supra note 15, at 17; Eur. Ct. H.R, Annual Report
2015, Speech Given by Mr. Dean Spielmann, 36 (2015), https://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/AnnualReport_2015_ENG.pdf
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sea,121 or international humanitarian law.122 This means in practice that
while deciding on an individual case, the Court shall take into account
and cooperate between its case law as a whole and other norms of
international law. The use of the harmonious interpretation "as far as
possible" means that the Court must also have regard for the special
character of the ECHR as a human rights treaty.23
Coordination among the Court's own decisions on the one hand,
and between its own case law and other regimes of international law
on the other hand, facilitates good administration of justice and
procedural economy, because its precedents and external sources of
international law might prevent the needless proliferation or
prolongation of proceedings.
The above-mentioned principles of the coordinated settlement shall
endorse the Court's procedure while facing its massive case law.
While deciding on individual cases, the Court should ease its fact-
finding and legal analytical burden by applying the principles of
subsidiarity, good administration of justice and procedural economy,
and the coherent and harmonious interpretation of the Convention.
Some of those principles conflict which each other in the sense that
their application might limit that of other principles. Especially good
administration of justice and judicial economy might threaten
individual justice and thus the Convention's effectiveness if no due
consideration is given to each particular case. For instance, judicial
economy requires the Court to strike out an application if "it is no
longer justified to continue its examination,'1 24 while the effectiveness
of the Convention might justify its continued examination if it "would
contribute to elucidate, safeguard and develop the standards of
protection under the Convention.'1 25 This is a discretionary question
that the Court can decide on only if it has a general overview of its
121. See Medvedyev v. France, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 96-101.
122. See Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 49-50, 61-62;
Varnava v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 13, 75-76 (2009).
123. Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 410-11 ("It is correct, as
the applicants and intervening Government asserted, that the Convention should be
interpreted as far as possible in harmony with other principles of international law
of which it forms part... however, the Court must also have regard to its special
character as a human rights treaty .... ).
124. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 37(1)(c), supra note 2.
125. Id.; see also Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 199, 209.
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past and pending cases. As a precedent in concurrent applications from
separatist areas, several applicants from Eastern Ukraine challenged
the abduction and arbitrary detention of their relatives by separatist
forces and later, after the release of their relatives, expressly stated that
they no longer wished to pursue their application.'26 The Court decided
to strike out those applications, given the fact "that a number of cases
concerning similar facts and raising similar issues under the
Convention have been brought before the Court and is currently
pending before it," and that "[t]he Court will therefore have an
opportunity to determine legal issues involved in these cases."12 This
is an example of prioritization of judicial economy, while protecting
the effectiveness of the Convention through other pending cases.
Thus, the coordinated settlement of concurrent applications is based
on the application of all the above-mentioned principles. On the one
hand, the Court should find the right balance between its main
function, individual justice, and effectiveness of the Convention, and,
on the other hand, the principles of subsidiarity, good administration
of justice and procedural economy, and the coherent and harmonious
interpretation of the Convention. As the Part III explains, the first
concurring element that challenges the application of those principles
is the various international dispute settlement mechanisms that S ates
or individuals have seized from separatist areas simultaneously in
parallel with their application to the ECtHR.
III. CONCURRENT PROCEDURES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION
OR SETTLEMENT
Concurrent applications to different dispute settlement bodies
suppose the concurrent jurisdiction of those judicial or investigative
bodies over the same facts and legal questions.'28 If there is no
126. See Zosim v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 58316/14 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-179511; see also Polovynko v. Ukraine, App.
Nos. 52061/14 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
165564.
127. Polovynko, App. Nos. 52061/14 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 11; Zosim, App. Nos.
58316/14 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 11.
128. See Schreuer, supra note 52, at 511 ("The most obvious cases of concurrent
jurisdiction arise in situations in which national and international proceedings are
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structural coordination among the different international fora having
overlapping jurisdiction, concurrent procedures might result in the
substantive fragmentation of international law. 129  Without
coordination between concurrent international investigation or dispute
settlement mechanisms in simultaneous proceedings related to
separatist conflicts, international adjudicatory bodies ri k the adoption
of contradictory conclusions on fact or law that would create legal
uncertainty. Furthermore, each dispute settlement body would be
obliged to reconstruct the legal and factual background of complex
and large-scale violations of international law as a first instance court.
Therefore, coordination between concurrent international
investigation or dispute settlement mechanisms is crucial to ensure
legal certainty and to ease the legal analytical and fact-finding burden
on dispute settlement bodies.
This Part first argues that the ECtHR should coordinate between
concurrent procedures of international investigation or settlement and
its own mechanism in the sense that it shall narrowly interpret the
identity of the facts, complaints, and the applicant of the concurrent
proceedings for the purposes of lispendens and resjudicata rules (Part
III.A). This ensures that individuals submitting concurrent
applications have access to the ECtHR if the other forums do not
provide effective remedy. Second, this Part explains that even if the
lis pendens and res judicata rules of the ECtHR do not significantly
reduce the Court's backlog, taking into account the substantive
conclusions of concurrent procedures of international investigation or
settlement assures the harmonious interpretation of the Convention
with other rules of international law and eases the Court's fact-finding
burden (Part III.B).
A. COORDINATION OF PROCEEDINGS
Under Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR, the Court shall find
open to the same parties to pursue the same claim.").
129. See Dupuy & Viftuales, supra note 52, at 143 ("The situation in the
international legal order is in part similar and in part different to that of domestic
systems. Like domestic systems, the areas and issues covered by international law
have become increasingly diverse and complex. Yet, no explicit coordination has
been developed between the institutions established to implement this growing body
of obligations.").
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inadmissible any application submitted under Article 34 on individual
applications that "is substantially the same as a matter that has already
been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another
procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no
relevant new information."'30 Thus, the ECHR excludes any re-
litigation of identical claims already submitted to (lis pendens) or
decided by (res judicata) another international procedure,3' whereas
other human rights treaty bodies define lis pendens more flexibly, only
excluding an identical matter actually pending under another
procedure of international investigation or settlement.'32 The rule aims
at preventing the risk of diverging interpretations of similar
provisions of international human rights treaties.'33 Before the ECtHR,
130. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 35(2)(b), supra note 2.
131. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a
Communications Procedure, opened for signature Dec. 19, 2011, 1577 U.N.T.S. I-
27531 (entered into force Apr. 14, 2014); see also Rules of Procedure of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Rule 93 §2(j), approved May 26, 2010,
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/rules-of
procedure_2010_en.pdf; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights art. 33(1), approved November 13, 2009, http://www.oas.org/en!
iachr/mandate/Basics/RulesIACHR2013.pdf; Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 3(2)(c), G.A. Res. 63/117,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter OP-ICESCR]; Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women art. 4(2)(a), G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter OP-CEDAW]; Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 22(4)(a), G.A.
Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights art. 56(7), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, U.N. Doc.
A/61/611 (entered into force May 3, 2008) [hereinafter OP-CRPD].
132. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance art. 31(2)(c), G.A. Res. A/RES/61/177, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/
2006/1 (Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter ICED]; see also Pact of San Jose art. 46(1)(c),
supra note 66 (stating that the Commission will admit a petition when the subject of
the petition is not in a status of pending with other international tribunals); Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 5(2)(a), Dec.
16, 1966, U.N. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (entered into force
in 1976) [hereinafter OP-ICCPR].
133. See August Reinisch, International Courts and Tribunals, Multiple
Jurisdiction, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10
(Apr. 2011), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epi1/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e41 ?rskey-AUZMZo&result- 1 &prd-EPIL.
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several respondent States invoked ongoing inter-state court
proceedings or status talks about the given disputed area as a
preliminary objection precluding the admissibility of the
application."'
First, the preliminary objection of lis pendens could be raised in
inter-state applications. In the Georgia v. Russia (II) case, concerning
systematic human rights violations allegedly committed by Russian
forces and/or by the separatist forces under their control in the August
2008 armed conflict, Russia argued that the application concerned
essentially the same dispute as the pending Georgia v. Russian
Federation case before the ICJ. 13" It added that the same complaints
lodged under Article 14 taken in conjunction with other provisions of
the ECHR-concerning alleged discriminatory attacks directed
against civilians of Georgian origin-as already subjected to ICJ
examination.'36 Without examining whether the two procedures
concerned the same matter, the ECtHR briefly noted that after the ICJ
had held in ajudgment of April 1,2011, that it did not have jurisdiction
to entertain the application,3 the procedure before that international
court had accordingly "come to an end."'38 Furthermore, the Court
held it "clear from the explicit wording of Article 35(2) of the
Convention that it applies only to individual applications" and
consequently dismissed Russia's preliminary objection.'39
Regardless of the lis pendens rule, one might argue on the basis of
the preeminent role of the ICJ in the development of international law
or the international comity between tribunals4 ' that the ECtHR should
134. Lilian Apostol, The Role of the ECHR and Other Human Rights Bodies
During the Ukrainian Conflict, Its Eventual Settlement and Aftermath, SSRN 22
(Apr. 25, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-2982277.
135. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Memorial of Geor., [2009] 1 I.C.J. (Sept.
2).
136. Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 77 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-108097.
137. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 70, 75 (Apr. 1).
138. Georgia, App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 77.
139. Id. 79; Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Comm'n H.R (1996),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-3213; Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 8007/77,
Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1983), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-104211.
140. Dupuy & Vifiuales, supra note 52, at 144-147.
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stay its proceedings and wait for the decision of the ICJ in case of
concurrent inter-state applications. However, human rights tribunals,
like the ECtHR, could easily reject proposals granting the ICJ
prejudicial competence for a case pending concurrently before another
international court'4' on account of their judicial autonomy. This
served as the main argument of the IACtHR to a State party's request
to decline its competence to give an advisory opinion in a concurrent
contentious case pending with the ICJ, for reasons of "prudence, if not
considerations of comity."'42 The IACtHR rejected the claim, stressing
that the Court is an "autonomous judicial institution."'43 Indeed, in the
present state of international law there exists no hierarchy between
international courts, and the ECtHR has the autonomy for deciding
disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the
Convention.'44 Consequently, similar but not identical claims pending
before the ICJ or other international tribunals shall not limit the
jurisdiction of the ECtHR to rule on inter-state applications. While
procedural economy and comity might incline the ECtHR to suspend
its procedure until the decision of the ICJ on similar factual or legal
questions,'45 the procedural autonomy of the Court and the
effectiveness of the Convention should prevail: for these reasons, the
Court should proceed without suspending or slowing down its
procedure.
Second, as for individual applications, Turkey raised the
preliminary objection of the lis pendens rule in the Varnava v. Turkey
case before the European Commission of Human Rights
(Commission), claiming that the applications on the sort of persons
that disappeared in the conflict of Northern Cyprus concerned a matter
that had already been submitted to another procedure of international
investigation or settlement of the Committee on Missing Persons
141. See Tullio Treves, Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice
on Questions Raised by Other International Tribunals, 4 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N.
L. 215, 215 (2000); Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial
Institutions, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 848, 862 (1995).
142. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, 55 (Oct. 1, 1999).
143. Id. 44, 61.
144. Cyprus, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Comm'n H.R at 28.
145. Apostol, supra note 134, 102.
[34:1
CONCURRENT APPLICA TION BEFORE THE ECTHR
(Committee)-a bi-communal body established with the participation
of the United Nations.'46 The Commission found lis pendens
procedures inadmissible under the ECHR as "procedures in which a
matter is submitted by way of 'a petition' lodged formally or
substantively by the applicant."'4 This was not the case with the
Committee on Missing Persons because Turkey was not a party to the
procedure, the Committee could not "attribute responsibility for the
deaths of any missing persons or make findings as to their cause," and
finally because "the Committee's investigating capacity is limited."'48
Consequently, the European Commission of Human Rights concluded
that that the Committee is not "a procedure of international
investigation or settlement" of the "matter" in the Varnava case."'
Another contested issue concerned whether the identity of the
applicant excludes the admissibility of an individual application of
which claim has been equally addressed by an inter-state application.
Such a scenario has occurred with respect to Northern Cyprus, the
Georgian, and the Ukrainian separatist areas, subject to numerous
individual and inter-state applications before the Court.5 ' The
Commission left the question open. First, in the Donnelly v. United
Kingdom case'5' concerning the alleged ill-treatment of detainees in
the context of the armed hostilities in Northern Ireland, the
Commission did not find the lispendens or resjudicata rule applicable
on account of the then pending Ireland v. United Kingdom case,
152
even though in the latter case the Government applicant referred to the
treatment of some applicants in support of its allegations under Article
3 of the ECHR. The Commission shortly held that the resjudicata rule
could not apply because the examination on the merits of the inter-




149. Id. at 14.
150. See generally Lisnyy v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 5355115 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 1
(2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-165566; Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 52.
151. See generally Donnelly v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5577/72 et al., Eur.
Comm'n H.R. (1973), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-3173.
152. See generally id.; Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5310/71 & 5451/72,
Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1972), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-142537.
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state case still remained to be carried out.'53 The Commission drew the
same conclusion in the Varnava case, where Turkey claimed that the
application concerned a matter which the Commission had examined
previously in three Cyprus v. Turkey inter-state cases.'54 After the
Court adopted its judgment in the Cyprus v. Turkey case which
included findings of violations under Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the ECHR
concerning missing Greek Cypriots and their families, Turkey argued
in the Varnava case that Article 35(2)(b) barred examination of the
individual applications that were "substantially the same."'55 The
ECtHR did not accept the Turkish position and found that by
introducing an inter-state application a Government applicant thereby
does not deprive individual applicants of the possibility of introducing
or pursuing their own claims.'56 Therefore, because of the difference
of the applicants' character and interests,5 a pending or already
decided inter-state case, even if expressly addressing human rights
violations against the same individuals, cannot exclude the
admissibility of an individual application with the same subject
matter.'58 The lis pendens rule excludes the admissibility of an
application only if the application concerns substantially not only the
same facts and complaints but also introduced by the same persons.
The Court further clarified whether the lis pendens rule applies to
international status negotiations discussing certain human rights issues
addressed in an application before the ECtHR.'59 In the Chiragov v.
153. Donnelly, App. Nos. 5577/72 et al., Eur. Comm'n H.R. 5.
154. Varnava v. Turkey, App. Nos. 16064/90 et al., Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1, 13
(1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-4179.
155. Varnava v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 13, 53, 114.
156. Id. at 54, 118.
157. LEO ZWAAK, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 173-79 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006) (holding that the
commission considered the present application as already having been examined
regardless of its relevance as an individual application).
158. Berdzenishvili v. Russia, App. Nos. 14594/07 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 44
(2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-00 1-169648 (explaining the joinder of the
parties due to similar subject matter and factual background); Dzidzava v. Russia,
App. No. 16363/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 65 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
169649; Shioshvili v. Russia, App. No. 19356/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-169650.
159. See generally Chiragov v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-108383; Varnava, App. Nos. 16064/90
et al., Eur. Comm'n H.R.
[34:1
CONCURRENT APPLICA TION BEFORE THE ECTHR
Armenia case, Azerbaijani Kurds complained of their inability to
return to their homes and property in the Lachin area, which belongs
to the internationally-recognized territory of Azerbaijan but remains
under Armenian occupation, after being forced to leave in 1992 during
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.6 ' The
Armenian Government argued that the matters raised in the
application had already been submitted to another international
institution for settlement, the ongoing negotiations conducted within
the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), which comprised of questions relating to the
resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as
compensation issues.'6' Similar to the Varnava case, the Grand
Chamber required that "a criterion for finding that the application
before the Court is substantially the same as another matter is that the
latter has been submitted by way of a petition lodged formally or
substantively by the same applicants.'6 2 The Court held that OSCE
inter-state talks on Nagorno-Karabakh, "where the applicants are not
parties and which cannot examine whether the applicants' individual
rights have been violated," do not constitute a "procedure of
international investigation or settlement" of the matters which are the
subject of the concrete application.'63
To summarize the precedents, Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR only
excludes admissibility where the application before the Court
concerns substantially not only the same facts and complaints but also
introduced by the same persons.'64 To find the matter identical, the
Court examines the nature of the dispute settlement body, its
procedure, and the legal effect of its decisions.'65 Thus, the lispendens
rule clearly does not apply to inter-state applications and applies to
individual applications under restricted conditions. The Court should
find with sufficient certainty that the finding of the international




164. European Convention on Human Rights art. 35(2)(b), supra note 2.
165. See generally UCA v. Turkey, App. No. 73489/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-147660; Peraldi v. France, App. No. 2096/05,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-92489.
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investigation or settlement also concerned the case of the applicants
before the Court and against the same State, that is both the applicant
and the same respondent State must be a party to the procedure.
Furthermore, the concurrent procedure of international investigation
or settlement shall satisfy certain qualitative criteria: it must be able to
attribute responsibility for the human rights violations or make
findings as to their cause and the dispute settlement body's
investigating capacity must present certain effectiveness.
166
In the case of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian State and
individuals have initiated various concurrent proceedings. As for the
dispute settlement procedures initiated by Ukraine, Kiev seized the
ICJ alleging several violations of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) in Eastern
Ukraine and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in Crimea by Russia.'6 The
ICJ adopted its order on provisional measures on April 19, 2017, and
held that it had prima facie jurisdiction to deal with the case, under
Article 24(1) of the ICSFT and under Article 22 of the CERD. 168 While
the case will remain pending before the ICJ in the coming years,
several claims that Ukraine raised may overlap with applications filed
with the ECtHR. In this regard, the claims submitted in the inter-state
applications should not be taken into account because, as explained
above, the lis pendens rule does not apply to inter-state applications
before the ECtHR. However, individual applications before the
ECtHR do concern the same human rights violations as the ICJ's
Ukraine v. Russia case. In the latter case, Ukraine is requesting the
world court to order Russia to make full reparation for the shelling of
166. Varnava v. Turkey, App. Nos. 16064/90 et al., Eur. Comm'n H.R. 1, 15
(1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-4179 (holding that the Committee is
incapable of attributing responsibility for the deaths to Turkey because Turkey is not
a party to the procedure before that that Committee).
167. Terrorism Financing and Racial Discrimination in Ukraine (Ukr. v. Russ.),
Application Instituting Proceedings, 2017 I.C.J. 1, 36-47 (Jan. 16) (outlining the
legal grounds for Ukraine's claims).
168. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), Order, 2017 I.C.J. 62 (Apr.
19).
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civilians in various cities in the separatist areas of Eastern Ukraine,169
whereas before the ECtHR individual applicants are complaining
about the violation of their right to property, their right to life, and the
prohibition of torture in the course of military hostilities in Eastern
Ukraine.' 0 Similarly, Ukraine's request to order Russia the "full
reparation for all victims of the Russian Federation's policy and
pattern of cultural erasure through discrimination in Russian-occupied
Crimea""'' might overlap with the Crimean individual applications
before the ECtHR. However, even if the ICJ decided in favor of
Ukraine and ordered full reparations, the applicants before the ECtHR
are not parties to the ICJ procedure and the world court cannot
examine whether the applicants' individual rights under the ECHR
have been violated. Consequently, the individual applications directed
against Russia or Russia and Ukraine would not be inadmissible under
Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR since there is no identical matter.
Another concurrent procedure might be the individual complaints
procedures of UN treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee,
the Committee against Torture, or the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Currently, eight of the UN human
rights treaty bodies may under certain conditions receive and consider
individual complaints or communications from individuals. 12 Ukraine
is a party to seven of the respective instruments,' while Russia is a
party to four of them.' Whereas Ukraine and Russia have not
169. Ukr. v. Russ., Application Instituting Proceedings, 2017 I.C.J. 136.
170. See generally ECtHR Press Release, Case Concerning Events in Crimea and
Eastern Ukraine, supra note 20; Lisnyy v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 5355115 et al., Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1-21 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-165566 (outlining
various claims of property damage, the right to home, and violations of the right to
life).
171. Ukr. v. Russ., Application Instituting Proceedings, 2017 I.C.J. 138.
172. See generally OP-CEDAW, supra note 131; OP-ICCPR, supra note 132;
OP-CRPD, supra note 131; ICED, supra note 132; OP-ICESCR, supra note 131;
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Professionallnterest/crc-sale.pdf [hereinafter OP-CRCCP].
173. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: OP-ICESCR, UNHR,
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited June 16, 2018).
174. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard: OP-ICESCR, ICED, OP-
CRPD, OP-CRCCP, UNHR, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited June 16, 2018).
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formally seized the CERD with their dispute on Crimea before the ICJ
procedure,' individuals might direct their human rights petitions to
one of the UN human rights treaty bodies under the respective human
rights treaties to which Ukraine or Russia are parties. Such a quasi-
judicial complaint procedure will constitute a "procedure of
international investigation or settlement""'6 under Article 35(2)(b) of
the ECHR. However, petitions pending before UN treaty bodies are
not communicated until held inadmissible or decided on the merits,
and since the outbreak of the Ukrainian armed conflicts, no UN treaty
bodies have published a decision concerning Crimea or Eastern
Ukraine.' Moreover, it is highly unlikely that individuals will submit
communications before any of the UN treaty bodies, having only
power to make recommendations to the respondent State, before
exhausting the "stronger" remedy of the ECtHR, leading to a decision
binding the State party.
Beyond UN treaty bodies, individuals may also address claims to
the Human Rights Council within its confidential complaints
procedure, successor of the former "1503 procedure.""'8 However,
unlike the treaty bodies' individual petition mechanism, the Human
Rights Council complaints procedure is not a quasi-judicial procedure
leading to a formal decision on the State's responsibility, but an
examination of the case by two working groups cooperating with the
175. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), Order, 2017 I.C.J. 60 (Apr.
19) ("Although both Parties agree that negotiations and recourse to the procedures
referred in Article 22 of CERD constitute preconditions to be fulfilled before the
Seisin of the Court, they disagree as to whether these preconditions are alternative
or cumulative.").
176. Vojnovi6 v. Croatia, App. No. 4819/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 31-32 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-112143; Peraldi v. France, App. No. 2096/05,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-92489; Fornieles v. Spain,
App. No. 17512/90, 73 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 214, 223 (1992).
177. See About the Jurisprudence, OHCHR.oRG, http://juris.ohchr.org/Home
/About (last visited June 16, 2018) (highlighting the goals of the Jurisprudence
database).
178. Human Rights Council Complaint Procedure, OHCHR.oRG,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ComplaintProcedure/Pages/HRCComp
laintProcedurelndex.aspx (last visited June 16, 2018) (outlining the complaint
procedure established by "Institution-Building of the United Nations Human Rights
Council").
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State concerned.' 9 Since the procedure examines the human rights
situation in a State and not individuals' complaints, and because it
does not aim at offering direct reparation to victims, the ECtHR does
not consider it as a "procedure of international investigation or
settlement."'80 The same applies to the CoE Committee for the
Prevention of Torture which is particularly active in separatist areas,'8'
but also does not offer direct reparation for the victims. 8 2 Neither can
exclude the admissibility of ECHR applications, the so-called
communication procedure of the Human Rights Council: in this
proceeding, special mandate-holders intervene directly with the State
on allegations of violations of human rights that come within their
mandates by means of letters which include urgent appeals and other
communications.'83 Such communications have been addressed to the
Ukraine government with respect to alleged cases of arbitrary arrest,
disappearance, and summary executions of civilians in Eastern
179. See generally Human Rights Council Res. 511, Annex B.2.4(b) (June 18,
2007).
180. Peraldi, App. No. 2096/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 11; Celniku v. Greece, App. No.
21449/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-81431;
Mikolenko v. Estonia, App. No. 16944/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-72118.
181. See, e.g., Eur. Comm. for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), Report on the Visit to the Region of
Abkhazia, Georgia, Carried Out by the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from 27 April to 4
May 2009, at 3, CPT/Inf (2009) 38 (2009), https://rm.coe.int/16806961da; Eur.
Comm. for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Report to the Government of the Republic of Moldova on the Visit to
Prison Establishment No. 8 in Bender Carried Out by the European Committee for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CPT), at 7, CPT/Inf (2008) 37 (2008), https://rm.coe.int/16806975a4.
182. Podeschi v. San Marino, App. No. 66357/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. 95 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-172665; Zagaria v. Italy, App. No. 24408/03,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-87263; De Pace v. Italy,
App. No. 22728/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 26-28 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i-001-87620.
183. Communications, OHCHR.ORG, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/
Pages/Communications.aspx (last visited June 16, 2018) [hereinafter
Communications, OHCHR.oRG] (explaining that the "communication" process
within the Human Rights Council Special procedures "involves sending a letter to
the concerned State identifying the facts of the allegation, applicable international
human rights norms and standards, the concerns and questions of the mandate-
holder(s), and a request for follow-up action").
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Ukraine.'84 As the procedure relies on the cooperation of the State and
victims do not participate in the proceedings, it cannot constitute
"matters" under Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR.1'85 Similarly, the Court
did not consider the procedure of the UN Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances as "a procedure of international
investigation or settlement" of the "matter" which was pending before
the Court, because the Working Group does not investigate
disappearances, nor does it provide legal means of redress and cannot
attribute responsibility for the deaths of any missing persons or make
findings as to their cause.'86 However, the Court considered the
procedure of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention as
constituting "another procedure of international investigation or
settlement."'187 It took into account that the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention examines individuals' complaints, the authors of
the communication can participate in the procedure and are duly
informed on the procedural steps, and the Working Group determines
in a contentious procedure the State's responsibility88
184. Ariel Dulitzky (Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances), Mandate of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, U.N. Doc. UKR 3/3014 (Dec. 4, 2014); Christof
Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions),
Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, U.N. Doc. UKR 2/3014 (Nov. 3, 2014).
185. Communications, OHCHR.oRG, supra note 183.
186. Malsagova v. Russia, App. No. 27244/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.inteng?i-001-85506 ("[Iln the applicants' view, the Working
Group [on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances] could not be regarded as
judicial or a quasi-judicial body within the meaning of Article 35 § 2 (b) of the
Convention."); U.N. H.R. Comm., Communication 2117/2011, Views Adopted by
the Committee at its 112th Session, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2117/2011 7.9
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/788591?ln-en; U.N. H.R.
Comm., Communication 2132/2012, Views Adopted by the Committee at its 112th
Session, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/112/D/2132/2012 7.9 (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/788570/; U.N. H.R. Comm., Communication
1559/2007, Views, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/99/D/1559/2007 7.10 (Aug. 20, 2010),
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/688864/files/?ln-en (establishing the
Committee's ability to only determine whether there was a violation of the
Covenant).
187. Peraldi v. France, App. No. 2096/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-92489.
188. UCA v. Turkey, App. No. 73489/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-147660; Peraldi, App. No. 2096/05, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
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Other pending disputes concerning Crimea are the investment
arbitration proceedings brought by companies owned and controlled
by the Ukrainian state against Russia.'89 These Ukrainian companies
allege that the Russian Federation breached its obligations under the
Ukraine-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty9 ' by interfering with and
ultimately expropriating their investments, which may overlap with
similar individual applications claiming the violations of the right to
property in Crimea.' If the matters under the respective bilateral
investment treaties are "substantially the same" within the meaning of
Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR, the Court would likely hold that the
proceedings may be seen as "another procedure of international
investigation of settlement.'
9 2
In sum, the ECtHR considers only a limited number of mechanisms
as other procedures "of international investigation or settlement"
under Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR, namely those that he Court
considers as judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings similar to those set
up by the Convention.'93 The procedure of UN treaty bodies, the UN
189. See, e.g., Stabil v. Russ., PCA Case Repository No. 2015-35 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/122; Lugzor v. Russ., PCA Case
Repository No. 2015-29 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/
web/view/124; PJSC CB PrivatBank v. Russ., PCA Case Repository No. 2015-21
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/130; Everest Estate v.
Russ., PCA Case Repository No. 2015-36 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015),
https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/133; Aeroport Belbek v. Russ., PCA Case
Repository No. 2015-07 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/
web/view/123; PJSC Ukrnafta v. Russ., PCA Case Repository No. 2015-34 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/121.
190. See generally Agreement Between the Government of the Russian
Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine on the Encouragement and
Mutual Protection of Investments, Russ.-Ukr., Nov. 27, 1998, https://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2233.
191. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Human
Rights Deals with Cases Concerning Crimea nd Eastern Ukraine, ECHR 345 (Nov.
26, 2014), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library-ECHR&id-003-
4945099-6056223&filename-003-4945099-6056223.pdf ("Property belonging to
Ukrainian legal entities was subjected to unlawful control, namely by being taken
by the self-proclaimed authorities of the Crimean Republic.").
192. Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 519-26 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-106308.
193. Podeschi v. San Marino, App. No. 66357/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. 94 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-172665; Lukanov v. Bulgaria, App. No.
21915/93, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-2003.
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Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, or investor-State arbitration
proceedings constitute "another procedure of international
investigation or settlement," provided that the "matters" are the
same.'94 "Matters" are identical only if the application before the
ECtHR concerns substantially not only the same facts and complaints
but also introduced by the same persons. 195 On the one hand, the strict
scrutiny of the identity of the facts, complaints, and the applicant for
the purposes of lis pendens and res judicata does not significantly
reduce the Court's backlog. It is unlikely that many of the applications
from separatist areas are found inadmissible on account of a decision
of a UN individual communication procedure or an investor-State
arbitration.
On the other hand, the Court should continue to coordinate between
parallel international procedures of international investigation or
settlement and its own mechanism, because finding the case
inadmissible on ground of lispendens or resjudicata helps to share its
judicial burden with other international dispute settlement
mechanisms. Furthermore, the narrow interpretation of lis pendens or
res judicata ensures that individuals submitting concurrent
applications have access to the ECtHR if the other forums do not
provide effective remedy. This enhances the legitimacy and the
effectiveness of the Court and the Convention because the Court
remains the ultimate authority deciding on those human rights
disputes.
B. COORDINATION OF FINDINGS
The concurrent international dispute settlement and fact-finding
proceedings do contribute to the ECtHR's effectiveness, because the
Court can rely on the conclusions of other international forums to
ensure judicial economy. It is well-known that the ECtHR has engaged
increasingly in a "judicial dialogue," relying on the legal conclusions
of other international courts, pronouncements of international bodies
194. Vojnovi6 v. Croatia, App. No. 4819/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 31-32 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-112143; Peraldi v. France, App. No. 2096/05,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-92489; UCA v. Turkey,
App. No. 73489/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
147660; Yukos, App. No. 14902/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 519-26.
195. Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, supra note 73, 152-54.
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carrying out quasi-judicial procedures, and international
organizations.'96 As several international judges recognized, cross-
references to the judgments of other international jurisdictions not
only provides inspiration for the judge to settle the concrete case, but
strengthens the unity of international law and prevents
fragmentation.9 In cases submitted from areas outside the territorial
State's effective control, the Court cited ICJ case law when it had to
decide on a series of questions of general international law such as the
primarily territorial notion of jurisdiction,'98 the lawfulness of acts
adopted by unrecognized entities,'99 the judicial consideration of
statements from high-ranking officials,0 the concurrent application
of international human rights law and international humanitarian
law,20 the duties of the occupying power,2 the obligation to make
196. See, e.g., Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Plurality in the Fabric of
International Courts and Tribunals: The Threads of a Managerial Approach, 28
EUR. J. INT'L L. 13, 45 (2017) (noting the use of procedures to prevent parallel or
overlapping proceedings); Christos L. Rozakis, The European Judge as
Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 257, 274-76 (2005) (discussing the dialogue of the
ECHR with the international legal order).
197. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Compensation,
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 324 (June 19) (Declaration of Greenwood, J.)
(formulating that international law "is a single, unified system of law and each
international court can, and should, draw on the jurisprudence of other international
courts and tribunals, even though it is not bound necessarily to come to the same
conclusions").
198. Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, 299.
199. See, e.g., Mozer v. Moldova, App. No. 11138/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 137 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-161055; Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur.
Ct. H.R. 365,404-405; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 29-31 (describing
the vacuum of rights and protections for individuals that could arise if actions taken
by de facto authorities were disregarded by international courts).
200. See, e.g., Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 135, 213-214
(explaining that statements of high-ranking officials that were closely involved with
the dispute in question "are of particular evidentiary value when they acknowledge
facts or conduct that place the authorities in an unfavorable light").
201. See, e.g., Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 26-28, 49-50,
60-62 (clarifying that the ICJ has the view that protections under human rights
conventions do not cease in situations of international armed conflict, and that the
Court will apply human rights law, as well as the lex specialis, international
humanitarian law, in such situations).
202. See, e.g., Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 201 1-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305,347-348,
376-377 (discussing how Article 43 of the Hague Regulations obliges an occupying
power to "take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
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reparation in an adequate form in an inter-state dispute,3 the legal
personality of the UN as international territorial administration,4 or
the attribution of conduct to the State .20  Even if the Court does not
feel bound by the case law of other courts like in the question of
attribution of conduct of non-state entities to the State,6 it cites the
relevant case law and tries to follow an interpretation in harmony with
other rules of international law.2 1 Since many of the above-mentioned
questions will arise in separatist conflicts, the Court shall continue to
take into account the international case law and interpret the
Convention under the principle of harmonious interpretation.
Beyond the legal findings, the Court should take into account the
factual conclusions of other jurisdictions and investigative bodies. The
factual complexities of the cases submitted from areas outside the
territorial State's effective control, the high number of submitted
applications from those areas, and the Court's overall workload with
more than 90,000 pending cases in 2017 all require the Court to have
resort to external sources that parties submit, rather than using its own
force in the country," and that internment should only be used as a last resort in
meeting that obligation).
203. See, e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 264 (explaining that
Article 41 of the Convention mirrors the public international law norm under which
"an injured state is entitled to obtain compensation from the state which has
committed an internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it").
204. See, e.g., Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 &
78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 144 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-80830
(describing that while the legal personality of the UN is separate from its member
states, and it is not a Contracting Party to the Convention, its action and inaction are,
in principle, attributable to it).
205. See, e.g., Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, 278-279, 301
(explaining that the ICJ may equate conduct by a person or entity to that of a state
organ, even if such conduct would not be attributable to the state under internal law,
if the person or entity "acted in accordance with that state's instructions or under its
'effective control' and if such instructions or effective control were given in respect
to the individual operation under which t e violations occurred, rather than just in a
general sense to the actions of the said person or entity).
206. The ECtHR cites the ICJ even when it follows an attribution test other than
the ICJ's. See Mozer v. Moldova, App. No. 11138/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 102 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-161055; see also Catan v. Moldova, 2012-V
Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, 243-344.
207. Hassanv. United Kingdom, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R 1, 49-50, 61-62; Catan,
2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 366; Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 72 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-108097.
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investigatory power under Article 38 of the ECHR.28 The factual
findings of other international dispute settlement bodies are
increasingly quoted by the ECtHR in the section "background of the
case."209 Due to the lower workload and the commonly used
investigative powers of other tribunals such as the ICJ or international
criminal tribunals, the ECtHR can obtain reliable evidence from case
law. For instance, in cases concerning Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,
the fact-finding of international organizations, dispute settlement
bodies, and non-governmental organizations should certainly provide
invaluable information that the Court alone could not investigate. To
give a specific example, in the pending case concerning the crash of
the Malaysian Airlines MH17 flight,2' the ECtHR should rely on the
published reports of internationalized fact-finding bodies established
in the Netherlands211 or the investigations of the ICC
212
In sum, with respect to concurrent procedures of international
investigation or settlement, the ECtHR should take into account all
closed and pending international procedures to decide on the
admissibility of individual applications and to contribute to the
effectiveness of its own mechanism. The Court shall examine the
nature of the dispute settlement body, its procedure, and the legal
effect of its decisions to decide whether the case before it constitutes
208. Michael O'Boyle & Natalia Brady, Investigatory Powers of the European
Court of Human Rights, 4 EUR. H.R. L. REv. 378, 387-88 (2013).
209. See Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, App. No. 65542/12, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 42-53 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-122255 (relying on
international decisions and judgments relating to the Srebrenica massacre); see also
Al Hamdani v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 31098/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 6-12
(2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-108994 (relying on the case law of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to summarize the relevant
background).
210. Ioppa v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 73776/14 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-165535.
211. Criminal Investigation MH1 7, OPENBAAR MINISTERIE, https://www.om.nl!
onderwerpenlmhl 7-crash/ (last visited on July 9, 2018); Investigation MH1 7 Crash,
July 17, 2014 Donetsk, ONDERZOEKSAAD VOOR VEILIGHED,
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/nllonderzoek/2048/onderzoek-mh 17-crash- 17-juli-
2014?s-EA2E71DOAAFDBE68F4E5CC2F3919A1BBB9568FOB (last visited on
July 9, 2018).
212. Preliminary Investigation of Ukraine, ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/ukraine
(last visited on July 9, 2018).
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a lis pendens or res judicata. In its decision, the Court should also
integrate the legal and factual conclusions of other international
procedures. Such an integrative approach assures a harmonious
interpretation of the Convention with other rules of international law
and eases the Court's fact-finding burden. In other words, the
coordination between the Court's mechanism and other concurrent
procedures of international investigation or settlement promotes good
administration, judicial economy, and the harmonious interpretation
of the Convention.
IV. CONCURRENT APPLICANTS
Applications from separatist areas are often submitted not only by
an individual victim but by a high number of victims, numerous
relatives of the victims, and/or the State of their nationality, typically
the territorial State. A high number of applications from areas outside
the effective control of the territorial State concern the same systemic
or structural deficiencies in the law or practice of defacto authorities
in the concerned area.213 Whereas the Court shall settle each
application individually, "[t]he good administration of justice requires
that similar facts be handled in the same way and under the same
rules.""' 4
The major challenges that the huge backlog from the same conflict
regions raises are the timely settlement of all cases, the need to
elucidate the factual and legal complexities of the underlying armed
conflict, the proper division of work between the Chamber and the
213. Such alleged structural deficiencies have been the reparation for the unlawful
expropriation of property (Northern Cyprus), the investigation and remedies for
enforced disappearance cases, unlawful practices of arrest, detention and criminal
procedures (Transnistria), denial of educational rights of linguistic minorities
(Transnistria, Crimea), death or injury of civilians and destruction of property in the
course of an armed conflict (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Eastern Ukraine),
remedies for internally displaced persons (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia,
Crimea, Ukraine), etc. See, e.g., Arabella Thorp, Property Disputes in Northern
Cyprus, HOUSE OF COMMONS (July 28, 2010) (highlighting the issue of property
transfer after the displacement of individuals in Cyprus).
214. Lucius Wildhaber, Discussion Following the Presentation by Lucius
Wildhaber, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY
APPLICATIONS: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 77, 89 (Riidiger Wolfrum &
Ulrike Deutsch eds., 2009).
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Grand Chamber, the undefined links between inter-state and
individual cases related to the same conflict, and the respect of the
proper administration of justice. In the precedents on separatist
conflicts, the Court has applied a variety of procedural techniques such
as the grouping of cases, namely the joinder or simultaneous
examination of applications (Part IV.A), and various techniques
prioritizing an individual case that leads to the settlement of numerous
similar cases (Part IV.B). As the scrutiny of each of those procedural
techniques will demonstrate, their wise combination might lead to a
coordinated settlement of the thousands of pending applications from
areas out of the territorial State's effective control.
A. GROUPING OF CONCURRENT APPLICATIONS
The joinder and simultaneous examination of applications serve the
objectives of the proper administration of justice and the common
treatment of analogous cases: they help to examine independent
applications in common or simultaneous procedures, thus easing the
legal analytical and fact-finding burden of the Court. However, the
difference between the criteria for the application of each of the two
procedures is not well-defined in the Rules of the Court; both occur
when the applications concern the same or similar factual
circumstances.215 A closer look at the precedents shows that their use
has been inconsistent and led to highly contestable decisions,
especially when joinder grouped legally similar but factually different
applications.
As for the first technique, the joinder of two or more cases is
common in the procedural rules of international tribunals: this
procedural tool allows courts "to address simultaneously the totality
of the various interrelated and contested issues raised by the Parties,
including any questions of fact or law that are common to the disputes
presented. '216 Hearing and deciding factually and/or legally similar
215. Maarten Den Heijer, Procedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in the
European Court of Human Rights 4 J. INT'L DIsP. SETTLEMENT 361, 370 (2013).
216. International Court of Justice, Rules of Court, art. 47 (Apr. 14, 1978)
(amended Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter ICJ Rules]; Construction of a Road in Costa
Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Joinder of Proceedings, 2013
I.C.J. Rep. 184, 17 (Apr. 17); Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border
Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Joinder of Proceedings, 2013 I.C.J. Rep. 177, 24 (Apr.
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217cases together has significant advantages as to procedural economy.
Under the Rules of the ECtHR, the "Chamber may, either at the
request of the parties or of its own motion, order the joinder of two or
more applications.'218 Within the mechanism of the ECHR, the States
parties encouraged the grouping of similar applications for a single
decision or judgment, through the settlement of "a small number of
representative applications from a group of applications that allege the
same violation against the same respondent State Party, such
determination being applicable to the whole group.'"219
The ECtHR resorted to the joinder of individual cases that had
"similar factual and legal background,'221 for example where the
alleged breaches were committed by agents of the international
territorial administration of the same area;22' where applicants suffered
from the same measures of defacto authorities;2 22 where the applicants
were relatives of persons disappeared uring the same armed
conflict;2 23 or where the applicants complained the deprivation of the
use of their property and/or access to their homes and the
ineffectiveness of the same domestic remedies of the de facto
authorities.224 The joinder of cases enables the Court to connect
17) (separate opinion by Trindade, J.).
217. Nicar., 2013 I.C.J. Rep. 184, 17-18.
218. ECtHR Rules 2018, supra note 90, at Rule 42(1).
219. Brighton Declaration, supra note 35, 20(d).
220. Gfirtekin v. Cyprus, App. Nos. 60441/13 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 16, (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-142369.
221. Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01,
Eur. Ct. H.R. Preamble (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-80830.
222. See, e.g., Turturica v. Moldova, App. Nos. 28648/06 & 18832/07, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 7-8 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-166480 (arguing againstthe
seizure of their cars); Bobeico v. Moldova and Iovcev v. Moldova App. Nos.
30003/04 & 40942/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i-001-158680 (highlighting teachers, employees of, and pupils of five
Moldovan schools in a pending case on Transnistria); Catan v. Moldova, 2012-V
Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, 4.
223. See, e.g., Giirtekin v. Cyprus, App. Nos. 60441/13 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R.
16 (2014); Emin v. Cyprus, App. No. 59623/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-110460; Emin v. Cyprus, App. Nos. 59623/08
et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-99466; Varnava v.
Turkey, App. Nos. 16064/90 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i-001-4179.
224. Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 377-378.
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hundreds or even thousands of applicants in one single procedure225
and also prevents the risk of diverging judgments,26 thus serving both
judicial economy and the harmony of the Convention.
If the parties do not request the joinder, for example, because the
applicants are unaware of each other, it is the Registry's responsibility
to inform the designated Chamber of the similar factual and legal
background justifying a joinder. This can even link applications
submitted in different years: for example, in the Demopoulos case,
eight individual applications submitted between 1999 and 2004
contested the effectiveness and availability of the same domestic
remedy instituted by the defacto authorities in 2005.22 Consequently,
the Court has a major function of reviewing and coordinating the legal
and factual background of all pending cases so as to identify the
interconnected cases that are likely to be joined.
Another way to coordinate concurrent applicants is the
simultaneous examination of cases: under the Rules of the Court,
"[t]he President of the Chamber may, after consulting the parties,
order that the proceedings in applications assigned to the same
Chamber be conducted simultaneously, without prejudice to the
decision of the Chamber on the joinder of the applications.' 228 The
precedents where the Court resorted to simultaneous examination of
cases concerned somewhat similar factual and legal backgrounds
where the applicants were in different situations, often constituting
two facets of the same coin. For example, the Axel Springer AG v.
Germany and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) cases related to the
media coverage of celebrities' private lives where one case concerned
a court order to publish a daily newspaper's article about the arrest and
225. See, e.g., Burmych v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 46852/13 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R.
129 (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-178082 (joining 12,143
applications listed in Appendices I and II to the judgment); Sandu v. Moldova, App.
No. 21034/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-116626
(pending case combining 8 applications from 1,651 applicants lodged between Oct.
2004 and Sept. 2006); Correspondence with Mr. Lilian Apostol, 28 March 2018 (on
file with author).
226. BERTRAND WAGENBAUR, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION.
COMMENTARY ON STATUE AND RULES OF PROCEDURES 631 (2013).
227. Demopoulos, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 391-393.
228. ECtHR Rules, supra note 90, at Rule 42(2).
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conviction of a famous actor,229 whereas the other concerned the
reverse scenario, the refusal of domestic courts to issue an injunction
restraining further publication of a famous couple's photograph that
was taken without their knowledge."' Contrary to the Chamber, the
Grand Chamber decided not to join the examination of those two
cases, considering that "the nature of the facts and the substantive
issues raised in those cases" were different,3' while it examined them
simultaneously. Indeed, the first case concerned a court decision
prohibiting the publication of an article, contested by the publisher,
while the second case concerned the court's refusal to limit the further
publication of already published media coverage that was contested
by the given celebrity. Different, but "complementary" situations
likewise justified the simultaneous examination of the Chiragov v.
Armenia and the Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan cases, both related to the
denial of access to homes to displaced persons in the context of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: whereas the Chiragov case concerned the
claim of Azerbaijani citizens displaced from the adjacent territories
occupied by Armenia to return to their homes, the Sargsyan case
concerned the claim of ethnic Armenians to return to their homes near
to the ceasefire line, in the territory and under the effective control of
Azerbaijan.2 The two cases presented two facets of the same highly
politicized frozen conflict from the point of view of displaced persons
of the two sides and of different ethnicities. These considerations led
the President of the ECtHR to assign the Chiragov v. Armenia and the
Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan cases to the same composition of the Grand
Chamber.3 While simultaneously examining those cases, the Court
intended to be as impartial and balanced as possible, trying to give
equal weight to both applications against Azerbaijan and Armenia, so
as not to exacerbate the very politicized inter-state tensions between
those two States parties.
229. Axel Springer AG v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 9 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-109034.
230. Von Hannover v. Germany (II), 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 399, 401-402.
231. Id. at 427; Axel Springer AG, App. No. 39954/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52.
232. Chiragov v. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 135, 154; Sargsyan v.
Azerbaijan, 2015-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 29-32 (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i-001-155662.
233. Chiragov, 2015-Ill Eur. Ct. H.R. at 146; Sargsyan, 2015-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at
12.
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In other applications examined simultaneously, the factual
background of the cases was less "complementary" and much more
similar. In the Veselinski and Djidrovski cases, both applicants, former
officers of the Yugoslav army, complained that they had a "legitimate
expectation" to purchase their apartments at the reduced price
provided for under the former Yugoslav legislation, whereas the
Macedonian authorities denied this right 4.2 " Although the President of
the Chamber decided to examine the two cases simultaneously "in the
interests of the proper administration of justice, ' 235 the facts, the
domestic law, and the Court's conclusions were almost identical in the
two cases and the Court could have easily joined the two applications,
in accordance with the principle of procedural economy. Similarly, the
Court examined simultaneously the Frasik v. Poland and Jaremowicz
v. Poland cases "in the interests of the proper administration of
justice," but the domestic law and the Court's conclusions were
identical and even the facts were similar.23 6 In those cases, the joinder
of the applications would have been fully justifiable and would have
spared the duplication of factually and legally identical procedures.
However, the simultaneous examination of cases is certainly
advisable when the applicants are in "symmetrical" situations where
their factual and legal background presents two facets of the same
highly politicized territorial conflict. This would arguably lead to
different outcomes from that of a procedure where the same
234. Djidrovski v. Macedonia, App. No. 46447/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1-3 (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-68385; Veselinski v. Macedonia, App.
No. 45658/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1-3 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
68378.
235. Djidrovski, App. No. 46447/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 6; Veselinski, App.
No. 45658/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 6.
236. The major difference was that in the Jaremowicz case, the authorities dealing
with the applicant's request for leave to marry justified their refusal by reference to
grounds related to the nature and the quality of the applicant's relationship with a
female detainee, whereas in the Frasik case, the reason for the denial was the trial
court's conviction that the marriage between the applicant and his former partner
whom he had raped would have adverse consequences for the taking of evidence
against him. However, the Court found that in both cases the underlying problem
was the "arbitrary fashion in which the Polish authorities exercised their decision-
making power" on a detainee's request for leave to marry in prison. See Frasik v.
Poland, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 29; see also Jaremowicz v. Poland,
App. No. 24023/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 64, (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
96455.
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applications joined. For instance in the Behrami and Saramati cases
concerning acts performed by Kosovo Force (KFOR) and UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) under the aegis of the
UN, the Court joined the Behrami and Saramati cases which
concerned slightly different factual scenarios.23 While the former
concerned an accident that occurred as a consequence of the demining
responsibilities of the UNMIK, a special mission and thus a de jure
organ of the UN, the latter related to detention that the KFOR
multinational brigade ordered."8 In a joined examination of the two
cases, the Court concluded that both conducts, demining by UNMIK
and detention by KFOR multinational brigades, were performed
under the "ultimate authority and control" of the United Nations
Security Council (Security Council) and thus attributable to the UN." 9
Since the UN had a legal entity distinct from its member states and
was not a contracting party to the Convention, the Court declared both
applications inadmissible ratione personae.24 As numerous critics of
the decision pointed out, the UN retained "ultimate authority and
control" over the UNMIK, but not over the KFOR, where the chain of
command stopped at the level of the commanders of national
contingents and where the Security Council exercised only a
superficial aposteriori control.24' Had the Court properly assessed the
237. Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-80830.
238. Id. 52-53.
239. Id. 134-35, 140-41.
240. Id. 144.
241. See, e.g., Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, L'(ir)responsabilit des forces
multinationales?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE QUEST FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION 104 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo Kohen eds.,
2010); Philippe Lagrange, Responsabilit6 Des Etats Pour Actes Accomplis En
Application Du Chapitre VII de La Charte Des Nations Unies - Observations d
Propos de La Decision de La Cour Europdenne Des Droits de l'homme (Grande
Chambre) Sur La Recevabilit6 Des Requetes Behrami et Behrami c. France et
Saramati c. Allemagne, France et Norvbge, 31 Mai 2007, 112 REVUE GENERALE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 85, 97-98 (2008); Pierre Klein, Responsabilit Pour
Les Faits Commis Dans Le Cadre D 'oprations de Paix et Etendue Du Pouvoir de
Contr6le de La Cour Europ~enne Des Droits de L 'homme: Quelques Consid~rations
Critiques Sur l'arr&t Behrami et Saramati, 53 ANNUAIRE FRANI2AIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 43, 54 (2007) (discussing that the reporting requirements of states
directed to use force by the UN Security Council are largely self-regulating, making
the notion of control of the mission by the Security Council more theoretical than
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''symmetrical" but different factual background and examined the two
applications in simultaneous rather than joined procedures, the
outcome could have been different. The procedural decision is all the
more important that unlike the simultaneous examination, the joinder
of cases does not oblige the Court to consult the parties to the dispute
prior to this procedural decision.242 For instance, the ICJ seems to
attribute particular importance to the views of the parties when it
decides on the joinder of cases.243 If the joinder opposed the interests
of the parties, the ICJ chose to litigate the cases in parallel.
244
Therefore, an ill-decided joinder can disregard the interests of the
parties and lead to improper conclusions.
Finally, a relatively new phenomenon is the submission of several
inter-state applications by the same State against another State
concerning similar claims. With regard to the situations in Crimea and
Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian government submitted six inter-state
practical); Theodore Christakis & Karine Bannelier, Acteur Vigilant Ou Spectateur
Impuissant? Le Contr6le Exerc Par Le Conseil de Scurit Sur Les Etats Autoris~s
ti Recourir ti La Force, 37 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 498, 516-17
(2004) (explaining that the UN Security Council has only loose control over states
operating under its direction; states are required to report their activities to the
Security Council, but there is not a lot of follow-up on the Council's part).
242. ECtHR Rules, supra note 90, at Rule 42(1)-(2).
243. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 43, 18 (joint declaration of
Bedjaoui, J., Guillaume, J., and Ranjeva, J.) (explaining in its decision not to join
the cases that the Court considered the parties had different arguments, even if for
the same legal issues, so it would be inadvisable to "effect a joinder leading to a
single judgment that would have to rule separately on those various arguments");
see also Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3,
5-6, 8 (July 25) (deciding not to join cases with identical basic legal issues because
of differences in the positions of the parties and the fact that joinder was contrary to
the wishes of both parties); Martins Paparinskis, Procedural Aspects of Shared
Responsibility in the International Court of Justice, 4 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 295, 304 (2013) (discussing the practice of the ICJ to consider
the parties' interests when deciding whether to join cases).
244. See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Serb. and Montenegro v. Belg.),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 287, 18 (Dec. 15)
(highlighting the claim of Serbia against NATO member states); Libya, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. at 13, 9 (referencing two proceedings
instituted by Libya against the United Kingdom and the United States of America).
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245applications against Russia, one of them being already withdrawn.
The Ukrainian Government argues that Russia has exercised and
continues to exercise effective control over Crimea nd-by
controlling separatists and armed groups there-defacto control over
the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk and consequently, those areas fall
within its jurisdiction.246 As there might be overlap between the inter-
state applications themselves and with individual applications, the
Court has to coordinate and logically group those inter-state claims.
It is highly unlikely that the Court examines joint or simultaneous
inter-state cases with individual applications, but it might join or
simultaneously examine the inter-state cases. Before starting any
admissibility procedure, the Court has already used its procedural
discretion to coordinate between the different claims of the five
pending Ukraine v. Russia applications. As the sort of the armed
conflict was unpredictable in 2014, the Ukrainian government
submitted an application firstly concerning the situation in the
Crimean peninsula (Ukraine v. Russia (I)), secondly on abductions of
children in Eastern Ukraine (Ukraine v. Russia (II)), and the later
applications concerning both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Ukraine v.
Russia (IV)-(VI)). 24' As the subsequent applications created a system
of overlapping claims, the Court decided to regroup the inter-state
cases in a logical way, according to geographical and time criteria. On
February 9, 2016, the Court decided "with a view of making the
processing of the case more efficient, to divide the first inter-state
application according to geographical criteria"-all the complaints
related to the events in Crimea up to September 2014 are currently
registered under the Ukraine v. Russia (I) case, whereas the complaints
concerning the events in Eastern Ukraine up to September 2014 are
now registered under the Ukraine v. Russia (V) case.248 Likewise, on
November 25, 2016, the Court decided to register all the complaints
related to the events in Crimea from September 2014 under the case
245. Factsheet - Armed Conflicts, ECHR (May 2018), http://www.echr.coe.int!
Documents/FS Armed conflictsENG.pdf; ECHR Press Release, Case Concerning
Events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, supra note 20.
246. Factsheet - Armed Conflicts, supra note 245; ECHR Press Release, Case
Concerning Events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, supra note 20.
247. Factsheet - Armed Conflicts, supra note 245.
248. Id.
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Ukraine v. Russia (IV) and all the complaints concerning the events in
Eastern Ukraine from September 2014 under the case Ukraine v.
Russia (VI). 249 To comply with the Court's above-mentioned core
principles, the coordination between the geographically and
temporarily interconnected claims, the joinder or simultaneous
examination of the inter-state cases is a welcome development and
should be followed in case of interrelated individual applications too.
B. PRIORITIZATION OF A CONCURRENT APPLICATION
Beyond grouping concurrent applications together, the Court can
select one particular case from the concurring applications and
prioritize its settlement, while deciding on the other concurrent
applications in conformity with the prioritized decision. The
underlying consideration of this coordination between concurrent
applications is that beyond individual justice, "the Court serves a
purpose beyond the individual interest in the setting and applying of
minimum human rights standards for the legal space of the
Contracting States.250 Such a general interest in prioritizing a specific
application might operate in the priority decision on the order of the
applications, sanctioned in the stricto sensu priority policy (Part
IV.B. 1), the application of the pilot procedure (Part IV.B.2), or the so-
called leading decisions (Part IV.B.3). While grouping of concurrent
applications is an existing practice of other international tribunals,5'
the prioritization of cases is a speciality of the ECtHR that the
exceptionally high number of applicants has made necessary.
1. Priority Policy
Most human rights treaty bodies having judicial or quasi-judicial
functions decide on individual applications in the order in which they
have been received by the control body's secretary.252 However, the
249. Id.
250. Varnava v. Turkey, App. Nos. 16064/90 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 156 (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-84336.
251. See, e.g., ICJ Rules art. 47, supra note 216 (providing for the joinder of
cases).
252. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Rules of Procedure, Rule 111(3), UN Doc.
CAT/C/3/Rev.6 (Sept. 1, 2014) ("[U]nless they decide otherwise."); Comm. on
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chronological treatment of applications in the order of their
submission date is problematic for a court with 50-60,000 applications
per year, because it does not allow for the prioritization of the most
important or urgent cases where judicial delay would cause significant
harm. Thus, to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention, the
ECtHR defined a priority policy in its Rules of the Court. Under those
rules, when determining the order in which cases are to be dealt with,
"the Court shall have regard to the importance and urgency of the
issues raised on the basis of criteria fixed by it." '253 To take into account
the importance and urgency of the issues raised in the cases filed with
the Court, the Court has fixed certain criteria which enable it to give
some cases priority over others. Among the seven main categories of
cases, the first two categories are:
I. Urgent applications (in particular risks to the life or health of the
applicant, the applicant being deprived of liberty as a direct consequence
of the alleged violation of his or her Convention rights, or other
circumstances linked to the personal or family situation of the applicant,
particularly where the well-being of a child is at issue (application of Rule
39 of the Rules of the Court)).
II. Applications raising questions capable of having an impact on the
effectiveness of the Convention system (in particular a structural or
endemic situation that the Court has not yet examined, pilot-judgment
procedure) or applications raising an important question of general interest
(in particular a serious question capable of having major implications for
domestic legal systems or for the European system).254
Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, Provisional Rules of Procedure Under the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Rule 8(1), UN Doc. E/C.12/49/3 (Jan. 15, 2013) ("[U]nless the Committee decides
otherwise."); Human Rights Comm., Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights
Committee, Rule 95, UN Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.10 (Jan. 11, 2012); Afr. Comm. on
Human and Peoples' Rights, Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights, Rule 95 (May 26, 2010), http://www.achpr.org/
files/instruments/rules-of-procedure-20 1 /rule s o fprocedure_2010_en.pdf;
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rules of Procedure of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rule 86(2), UN Doc.
CERD/C/35/Rev.3 (Jan. 1, 1986).
253. ECtHR Rules supra note 90, at Rule 41.
254. The Court's Priority Policy, ECHR, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
PrioritypolicyENG.pdf (last visited on June 30, 2018).
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The second category is especially likely to cover applications
coming from separatist areas, representing a conflict situation having
an impact on the effectiveness of the Convention system, serious
structural problems uch as the systematic violations of human rights
or the lack of effective domestic remedies, an important question of
general interest for an inter-state case. Therefore, concurrent
applications from those areas should be prioritized and treated in a
timely manner. The ECtHR seems to prioritize the cases submitted
from separatist areas such as Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Crimea, or the eastern separatist regions of Ukraine. For example, the
Court decided two applications from Eastern Ukraine within two
years,55 NGOs representing Transnistrian victims reported that none
of their applications had been found inadmissible256 and many of the
highly politicized cases were referred before the Grand Chamber. This
was the case for the Loizidiou,25 7 Cyprus v. Turkey (IV),
258
Demopoulos,259  Varnava,
26 °  Ilascu,261  Catan,
26 2  Chiragov,263
Sargsyan,264 Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia265 and the
pending Georgia v. Russia (11)266 cases; all of which were referred
before the Grand Chamber. Moreover, the Grand Chamber held two
255. Tsezar v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 73590/14 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 69-71 (2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.inteng?i-001-180845; Khlebik v. Ukraine, App. No. 2945/16,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-175656.
256. Interview with Ian Manole, NGO Promo-Lex (Sept. 6, 2012) (discussing
Chisinau) (on file with the author).
257. Loizidou v. Turkey (Article 50), App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-58201; Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No.
15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996); http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-58007;
Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-57920.
258. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 245; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV
Eur. Ct. H.R 5.
259. Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365.
260. Varnava v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 13.
261. Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179.
262. Catan v. Moldova, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 309.
263. Chiragovv. Armenia, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 135.
264. Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-155662.
265. Mozer v. Moldova, App. No. 11138/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-161055.
266. Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1-102 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-108097.
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hearings-one on the admissibility and another on the merits-in such
politicized cases: the Catan, Chiragov, and Sargsyan cases all had two
hearings - a unique case law in the history of the Court.26
However, the practice of the Court is not entirely consistent with
respect to the use of its priority policy. For instance, the ECtHR
communicated to respondent governments some cases complaining of
the Transnistrian defacto authorities' detention practice after a decade
had passed,268 while the applicants remained deprived of liberty during
the two years after the filing of their application, thus falling under
category I of the priority cases.269 Furthermore, even if some South
Ossetian cases were prioritized,2"0 none of the almost 2,000
applications from the Georgian separatist areas and the Georgia v.
Russia case have been settled for ten years.2 One can speculate about
the reasons for the lack of progress in the Georgian cases, as discussed
below, but as a matter of principle they should be prioritized over less
important cases. Under the maxim "justice delayed is justice denied,"
the lack of progress in those concurrent applications weakens the
Convention's effectiveness.
It must be admitted that the prioritization of cases alone is not
sufficient to effectively settle several thousand concurrent applications
if most of them are of equal priority.212 Hence, further coordination is
necessary between the applications: it will be explained that through
pilot judgments or leading cases, the Court should identify some
model cases that it settles first, while giving lower priority to similar
cases and resolving them on the model of the leading decision, unless
267. See generally Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R.; Sargsyan, App. 40167/06,
Eur. Ct. H.R.; Catan, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
268. Braga v. Moldova, App. 76957/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 24-28 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-177650; Draci v. Moldova, App. 5349/02, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 15 (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-177651.
269. Braga, App. 76957/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 7-16; Draci, App. 5349/02, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 11-12.
270. See, e.g., Parastayev v. Russia, App. 50514/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-108451.
271. But see Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Witness Hearing
in the Inter-State Case of Georgia v. Russia (II), ECHR 211 (June 17, 2016).
272. See Madsen, supra note 51, at 206 (noting that the Court has an estimated
backlog of 10,000 priority cases).
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they need high priority on account of their individual substance.2 3
2. Pilot Judgments
The Court may initiate a pilot procedure and adopt a pilot judgment
"where the facts of an application reveal in the Contracting Party
concerned the existence of a structural or systemic problem or other
similar dysfunction which has given rise or may give rise to similar
applications.' 214 Under a doctrinal definition, the pilot procedure must
have three mandatory elements: the ECtHR must "identify a structural
or systemic problem or other dysfunction, point out the type of
domestic remedies the respondent is required to develop and indicate
such measures in the operative parts of the judgment."' 215 The
instrument is an appropriate means to prioritize a case representing a
high number of analogous cases concerning the same region. Cases
selected for this procedure "shall be processed as a matter of
priority."2 6 The procedure reflects the principles of subsidiarity and
judicial economy, considering that the Court's supervisory role over
the Convention and the Protocols thereto "is not necessarily best
achieved by repeating the same findings in a large series of cases."2
Furthermore, once the Court renders a pilot judgment, it falls to the
national authorities, under the supervision of the Committee of
Ministers, to take the necessary remedial measures so that the Court
does not have to repeat its finding in a lengthy series of comparable
cases.
278
In concurrent cases from separatist areas, the pilot procedure has
273. See Steering Comm. for Hum. Rts., CDDH Rep. on the Advisability and
Modalities of a "Representative Application Procedure," CDDH(2013)R77
Addendum IV, 4-5 (2013) [hereinafter CDDH Report on a Representative
Application Procedure].
274. ECtHR Rules, supra note 90, Rule 61(1).
275. Dilek Kurban, Forsaking Individual Justice: The Implications of the
European Court of Human Rights' Pilot Judgment Procedure for Victims of Gross
and Systematic Violations, 16 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 731, 738 (2016).
276. ECtHR Rules, supra note 90, Rule 61(2)(c).
277. Rutkowski v. Poland, Apps. 72287/10 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 22 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-155815; Association of Real Property Owners
in L6d v. Poland, 2011-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 108-09.
278. Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 76-77.
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been effectively applied in the Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey case,"'
contributing to the radical decrease of the Court's workload from
Northern Cyprus. The case was filed by a Cypriot national of Greek-
Cypriot origin who had been prevented from living in her home or
using her property in Northern Cyprus since 1974, since the invasion
of the region by Turkey-an archetypal case of hundreds of disputes
concerning Northern Cyprus."' In its judgment on the merits, the
Court indicated, under Article 46 of the ECHR, that the respondent
State "must introduce a remedy which secures genuinely effective
redress for the Convention violations identified in the instant judgment
in relation to the present applicant as well as in respect of all similar
applications pending before it."28' This conclusion has led to the
creation of a domestic remedy by the "TRNC," the so-called
Immovable Property Commission. With the decision, the Court took
into account the fact that, at that time, approximately 1,400 property
cases were pending before it brought primarily by Greek Cypriots
against Turkey282 and sought to "identify general measures the State
ought to take in order to comply with its judgment."283
Similarly, after applicants filed more than 3,300 applications with
the ECtHR to seek redress against either Georgia or Russia for alleged
human rights violations in the context of the armed conflict of August
2008, the Court addressed the question to the applicants whether their
application was suitable for the "pilot judgment" procedure.284 The
279. Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 398, 401 (discussing the
pilot procedure as applied in Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey).




283. Eur. Ct. H.R., Annual Report 2005, 89 (2006), https://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Annual report 2005_ENG.pdf (stressing that "although the judgment is
not a 'pilot judgment' in the strict sense, it forms part of a group of judgments in
which the Court has significantly developed its role in relation to the execution of
judgments").
284. Question to the parties, communicated cases visited on Dec. 21, 2017. See,
e.g., Kulumbegov v. Georgia, App. No. 15213/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 5 (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-102598; Shmyganovskaya v. Georgia, App.
No. 34945/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 2 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
183999; Sipols v. Georgia, App. No. 8336/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 3 (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-18399; Bekoyeva v. Georgia, App. No.
48347/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 3 (2009).
[34:1
CONCURRENT APPLICA TION BEFORE THE ECTHR
major criterion of its instigation is that the application reveals "the
existence of a structural or systemic problem or other similar
dysfunction which has given rise or may give rise to similar
applications" in the concerned State party. Consequently, the Court
should coordinate its pending cases from separatist areas so that it
could identify the existence of a structural or systemic problem or
other similar dysfunction in the respondent State. The applicability of
the procedure is the most compelling in repetitive cases, but it can also
be of use in cases which may serve as a model for similar future
applications.286
However, the pilot procedure is not the only and most adequate
coordinating tool for concurrent applications from separatist areas, as
most root causes of the challenged human rights violations either
cannot be classified as "a structural or systemic problem or other
similar dysfunction"287 or there is no prospect of their domestic
settlement. As for the nature of human rights violations, it is difficult
to see how the Court could apply the criteria "structural or systemic
problem or other similar dysfunction"288 for violations in separatist
areas, where the main problems arise not from a domestic law
problem, but from administrative practice and violence. The only case
from a separatist area in which the Court arguably applied the pilot
procedure was the Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey case concerning the
domestic remedy for the expropriation disputes.289 Nevertheless, in
cases of massive violence such as extrajudicial killing, abductions,
enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, or shelling of houses, the
Court might be tempted to identify the core "structural or systemic"
root causes of the human rights violations at the national level and
apply the pilot procedure. While very case sensitive, it is perhaps not
impossible that the Court could choose this approach to settle
numerous concurrent applications from separatist areas.
As for the prospect of the domestic settlement of those human rights
violations, especially in ongoing international or non-international
285. ECtHR Rules, supra note 90, Rule 61(1).
286. Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 400-01.
287. ECtHR Rules, supra note 90, Rule 61(1).
288. Id.
289. Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 53 (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intleng?i-001-71800.
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armed conflicts, where high State interests are at stake (the
precondition of the success of the pilot judgment), the respondent
State's willingness to cooperate is unlikely.29 While the Court held
that the use of the pilot judgment procedure is not conditional on a
Government's compliance with the previous judgments,9' its efficacy
requires the respondent State and the Committee of Ministers in its
supervisory function to duly execute the judgment.292 Where the State
is unwilling or unable to fully implement the pilot judgment, all other
related and suspended applications will be "frozen."'293 Pilot judgments
might redress repetitive cases arising from a systemic problem in
domestic law or practice and order the implementation through the
establishment of a given effective and available remedy, but they seem
inadequate to address gross and large-scale violations in separatist
areas where legislative solutions in themselves might not provide
adequate answers.294 Nevertheless, legislative solutions are not the
only general measures pilot judgments can lead to. While there is
usually a regulatory basis that the respondent State shall adopt, the
Court can order, for example, the establishment of effective civilian
control over state security forces or human rights and international
humanitarian law training programs for law enforcement officials,
military, and security forces.95
290. See Kurban, supra note 275, at 764-69; Antoine Buyse, The Pilot Judgment
Procedure at the European of Human Rights: Possibilities and Challenges, 3 L.
UKR.: LEGAL J. 303, 315 (2013).
291. Demopoulos, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 400-01.
292. EUR. PARL. Ass., Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights, Res. 1516, 21 (2006).
293. Id.
294. See generally Kurban, supra note 275, at 767 (discussing the pilot judgment
mechanism and empirical research demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the pilot
judgment when applied to cases where ethno-political disputes are the underlying
issues).
295. See Montero-Aranguren v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 148, 11 (July 5, 2006)
("The State must adequately educate and train the members of armed forces to
effectively secure the right to life and avoid a disproportionate use of force.
Furthermore, the State must develop and implement a training program on human
rights and international standards regarding individuals held in custody aimed at
police and prison agents, as set forth in paragraphs 147 to 149 herein."); Blanco-
Romero v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 106,
11 (Nov. 28, 2005) ("The State is to include, as part of the education and training
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3. Leading Decisions
Some CoE documents vaguely mention "judgments of principle"
while referring to the interpretative authority (res interpretata) of
certain individual judgments of the ECtHR within the legal orders of
States other than the respondent State in a given case, without defining
the scope of those "judgments of principles. '296 The Evaluation Group
to the Committee of Ministers on the European Court of Human Rights
spoke about "constitutional judgments" of the ECtHR, defining them
as "fully reasoned and authoritative judgments in cases which raise
substantial or new and complex issues of human rights law. '297 Some
authors speak about "judgment of principle" when they refer to a
decision of the ECtHR that "may well settle the issue for many other
persons in a similar situation. '298 A more precise scholarly definition
of the notion "judgment of principle" or "leading decision" is a
judgment in which "the Court decides a Convention question on a
level of generality that makes it possible to apply the decision to
courses for the officers of the Armed Forces and the Office of the Sector Director
General of the Intelligence and Preventive Services Bureau, a program regarding the
principles and rules of human rights protection, particularly the prohibition against
forced disappearance, torture and isproportionate use of force, taking into
consideration the case-law of the Inter-American System for the Protection of
Human Rights, as a mechanism to prevent the recurrence of events such as the ones
in the instant case, as per paragraphs 106 and 116 of the instant Judgment.");
Caracazo v. Venezuela, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
127, 4(a) (Aug. 29, 2002) ( "[T]hat the State must take all necessary steps to avoid
recurrence of the circumstances and facts of the instant case, in accordance with
paragraph 127 of the instant Judgment, pursuant to which it will ... take all
necessary steps to educate and train all members of its armed forces and its security
agencies regarding principles and provisions on protection of human rights and the
limits to which the use of weapons by law enforcement officials is subject, even
under a state of emergency."); G.A. Res. 60/147, 23 (Mar. 21, 2006).
296. EUR. PARL. Ass., Effective Implementation of the European Convention on
Human Rights: The Interlaken Process, Doc. 12221, at App. II, 15 (2010).
297. Rep. of Evaluation Group, supra note 33, 98.
298. Anne Peters, Discussion Following the Presentation by Lucius Wildhaber,
in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY APPLICATIONS:
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 77, 78 (Riidiger Wolfrum & Ulrike Deutsch
eds., 2009); Paul Mahoney, Discussion Following the Presentation by Lucius
Wildhaber, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY
APPLICATIONS: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 77, 86-87 (Rfidiger Wolfrum
& Ulrike Deutsch eds., 2009).
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comparable pending applications."'299 Recently, the Court expressly
identified certain "leading cases," understood as individual
applications for which settlement serves as a model for hundreds of
similar follow-up cases."' After a "leading case" decides a generalized
problem, the Court will refer to this earlier case law as authoritative
precedent while deciding later cases of similar legal and factual
background. It serves the Court's effectiveness because after a leading
case, the Court does not have to deal any longer with the same question
of admissibility or merits in similar cases but can summarily decide
on it. The Court is likely to choose mainly priority cases to be treated
as judgments of principle.'
From separatist areas, individual decisions decided both
admissibility and merits questions that have served as points of
reference for subsequent decisions in similar cases. Several
admissibility questions of major importance were decided in such
leading decisions and systematically applied in subsequent cases as to
the admissibility. From the early Northern Cyprus case law, the Court
decided on the difficult question of the respondent State's jurisdiction
with regard to facts that occurred outside its territory, within a region
of another (territorial) State in an individual application, the Loizidou
v. Turkey case, whereas in subsequent cases the Court reiterated the
same principles adopted in Loizidou.3 2 In the concrete case, the
applicant had no access to her property situated in Northern Cyprus
and claimed for remedies; however, Turkey, the respondent State,
argued that the question of access to property in Northern Cyprus was
299. Lize Glas, Changes in the Procedural Practice of the European Court of
Human Rights: Consequences for the Convention System and Lessons to be Drawn,
14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 671, 676 (2014).
300. Chiragov v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.inteng?i-001-179554; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App.
40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 33, 63 (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
179555; Burmych v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 46852/13 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R 156-161,
app. 1 (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-00 1-178082 (identifying Sargsyan v.
Azerbaijan as a leading judgment) ; Muradyan v. Armenia, App. 11275/07, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 126 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-168852 (identifying
Chiragov v. Armenia as a leading judgment).
301. CDDH Report on a Representative Application Procedure, supra note 273,
4.
302. Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct.
H.R. T 62 (1995), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-57920.
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outside the realm of its "jurisdiction" and only the "TRNC,"
recognized as a State only by Turkey, had jurisdiction over life and
property in the region.3 The Court refused Turkey's arguments about
the restriction of the notion of "jurisdiction" under Article 1 of the
Convention to the national territory and held:
the responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a
consequence of military action-whether lawful or unlawful-it exercises
effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to
secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention
derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly,
through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration.
304
In the Loizidou case, for the first time in an admissibility decision,
the Court generally recognized that "effective control" over a
subordinated de facto administration might entail "jurisdiction"
ratione loci under Article 1 of the ECHR over individuals in the entire
separatist area.30 ' The same conclusion, that the Grand Chamber later
called "a broad statement of principle," served as a basis for deciding
about Turkey's general responsibility under the Convention for the
policies and actions of the 'TRNC' authorities in the inter-state Cyprus
v. Turkey (IV) case306 and in all subsequent cases where Turkey raised
the same preliminary objection ratione loci or ratione personae.0
A second admissibility question of major importance in separatist
conflicts is the admissibility ratione temporis in enforced
disappearance cases. In the Varnava case, Turkey argued that even in
a continuing situation of disappearance, the six months rule applies
under Article 35(1) of the Convention. 8 It added that in the concrete
303. Id. 56.
304. Id. 62.
305. Id. TT 62-63.
306. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 25 (2001).
307. See, e.g., Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 388; Djavit An
v. Turkey, 2003-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, 240-42 (2003); Kakoulli v. Turkey, App. No.
38595/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 86 (2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-71208;
Hapeshisi-Michaelidou v. Turkey, App. No. 35214/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2000),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-94218; Gavriel v. Turkey, App. No. 41355/98,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, 27 (2000), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-5070; Andreou
v. Turkey, App. No. 18360/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i-001-90979.
308. Varnava, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 64-65.
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case, the applicants had waited too long, for more than four years,
before bringing their cases before either the authorities and before the
ECtHR.3 9 The Court had to rule on this issue for the first time: it held
that in cases of disappearances, it is indispensable that the relatives of
missing persons do not unduly delay bringing a complaint about the
ineffectiveness or lack of such investigation before the Court.10 The
Court concluded that an application could be rejected as out of time
"in disappearance cases where there has been excessive or
unexplained delay on the part of applicants once they have, or should
have, become aware that no investigation has been instigated or that
the investigation has lapsed into inaction or become ineffective and,
in any of those eventualities, there is no immediate, realistic prospect
of an effective investigation being provided in the future."31' Based on
this principle, the Court rejected several subsequent applications in
disappearance cases as out of time claims. 2
A third example for leading cases at the admissibility stage is the
Court's decision to qualify a national mechanism as effective domestic
remedy that has to be exhausted. For instance, the Grand Chamber
held in its admissibility decision Demopoulos v. Turkey, concerning
deprivation of access to property, that Northern Cyprus had an
effective domestic remedy which the applicants failed to exhaust.3
As a consequence of the decision, the Court declared inadmissible all
similar applications.4 The Steering Committee for Human Rights of
Council of Europe welcomed this leading decision as "[one] particular
variant of the pilot judgment procedure," capable of responding to
concurrent applications.15 As a result of the Demopoulos decision,
309. Id.
310. Id. at 67; Varnava v. Turkey, App. 16064/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 28 (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-84336.
311. Varnava, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 68-69.
312. See, e.g., Efthymiou v. Turkey, App. No. 40997/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. C (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-120501; Emin v. Cyprus, App. No. 59623/08,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-99466.
313. Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 407, 415 (2010).
314. See, e.g., Efihymiou, App. No. 40997/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. C; Papaioannau v.
Turkey, App. No. 58678/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i-001-109153; Chrysostomos v. Turkey, App. No. 66611/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.
1-2 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-103 100.
315. CDDH Report on a Representative Application Procedure, supra note 273,
79.
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while the number of pending applications radically decreased by 1,400
cases before the ECtHR, the same litigants directed their claims to the
domestic "IPC" established in the "TRNC" (Table 1).316 While the
decision has been strongly contested as to the effectiveness of the local
remedies,"' the procedural technique intended to ensure to all
applicants individual justice and undoubtedly decreased the Court's
backlog.
Table 1
Number of pending applications concerning
property in northern Cyprus
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A fourth example of leading cases concerns documentary evidence
from a separatist region under ongoing armed conflict. In Lisnyy v.
Ukraine andRussia, the applicants complained that the shelling of the
villages in Eastern Ukraine where they lived "had hindered the
peaceful enjoyment of their property and dwelling places."'18 In its
inadmissibility decision, the Court clarified the rules for the
production of prima facie evidence to substantiate their allegations
which could serve as a model for future applications from ongoing
316. Proceedings of the Immovable Property Commission, IMMOVABLE PROP.
COMM'N (Feb. 15, 2018), http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/english/istatistik.html.
317. Elena Proukaki, The Right of Displaced Persons to Property and to Return
Home After Demopoulos, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 701, 714-15 (2014).
318. Lisnyy v. Ukraine, Apps. Nos. 5355115 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intleng?i-001-165566.
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armed conflicts.19
The admissibility questions decided in leading cases facilitate the
prompt settlement of numerous further applications from the same
region. If one examines the number of decided cases concerning
Northern Cyprus from the Loizidou admissibility decision of 1995
until the end of 2017 (Table 2), one finds that leading cases like
Loizidiou, Cyprus v. Turkey (IV) and Demopoulos, contributed largely
to the settlement of other similar applications within a short period of
time. After the first judgment concerning the region in the Loizidiou
case at the end of 1996, the Court rendered forty-one admissibility
decisions between 1998 and 2002, citing Loizidou as a leading case
for the admissibility ratione loci. A high number of similar
applications concerning expropriation of property and denial of
displaced persons' right to return to their homes were settled on the
merits in 2009 (thirty-seven judgments) on the model of the Loizidiou
and Cyprus v. Turkey (IV) judgments, while the amount of the just
satisfaction was settled in separate judgments in 2010 (thirty-three
judgments). The effect of the Demopoulos case is also manifest in the
increase of the number of inadmissibility decisions: in the same year,
in 2010, seven inadmissibility decisions involving forty-eight
applications relied on the Demopoulos case. In 2011, the Court
considered 875 applicants as no longer wishing to pursue their
applications in light of the Demopoulos case.2 °
319. Id. 26-27; see also Apostol, supra note 134, 67-68.
320. Kosta v. Turkey, Apps. No. 30984/96 & 35213/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intleng?i-001-108215.
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The number of decisions concerning Transnistria (Table 3) since
the first admissibility decision in the Ila~cu case (2001) shows, to a
lower extent, the facilitating role of leading cases. After the leading
decisions Ilascu, Catan, and Mozer, all rendered by the Grand
Chamber, the capacity of the Chambers to effectively settle
applications from the same region has largely strengthened, with seven
cases decided in the merits in 2017. To a lesser extent, the first two
admissibility and then merits decisions on Nagorno-Karabakh (Table
3), the Sargsyan/Chiragov judgments, seem to simplify the
proceedings of later cases from Nagorno-Karabakh: they were largely
cited in a Chamber judgment in another case in 2016321 and in the just
satisfaction judgments in the Sargsyan/Chiragov cases in 2017.322
321. Muradyan v. Armenia, App. No. 11275/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 126 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-168852.
322. Chiragov v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 44-48 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-179554; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No.
40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 26-30 (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
179555.
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Table 3
Number of decisions concerning Transnistria
and Nagorno-Karabakh per year
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Leading cases decided on the merits could be the solution for the
effective settlement of concurrent applications by individuals and a
State concerning the same subject matter or region. Ideally, the
government should withdraw an inter-state application protecting a
concrete individual citizen if the individual's application concerning
the same subject matter awaits a Court decision.23 This scenario
occurred with the third Ukraine v. Russia (III) case, concerning the
deprivation of liberty and treatment of a Ukrainian national belonging
to the Crimean Tatars ethnic group, "in the context of criminal
proceedings that the Russian authorities have conducted against
him." '324 However, once an inter-state application is maintained and
covers a wide range of human rights violations that individual
applications also address, judicial economy and effectiveness of the
Convention require that the Court settles the inter-state case as a
323. See Cyprus v. Turkey, 2014-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 254 (2014).
324. Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 49537/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-157568.
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judgment of principle, before resolving the individual cases raising
similar points.125 This was the case with the Cyprus v. Turkey (IV)
interstate case, which covered a wide range of legal questions not yet
resolved in the previous Northern Cyprus cases, such as the Loizidou
case. The Court established several conclusions of major importance
in the Cyprus v. Turkey (IV) judgment: "remedies available in the
'TRNC' may be regarded as 'domestic remedies';3 26 the displaced
persons' lack of access to their property and homes is regarded as
continuing violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and of Article 8,
respectively.1
2
In other words, where a State party files an application on behalf of
its citizens from the same region, the inter-state judgment is likely to
answer to numerous general questions raised also by the individual
applications. This is the case of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, and
Eastern Ukraine, where thousands of individual applications are
cumulated with inter-state applications. In the Georgia v. Russia case,
Georgia alleges that the Russian Federation had allowed or caused an
administrative practice to develop in violation of Articles 2, 3, 5, 8,
and 13 of the Convention, Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1, and
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, through indiscriminate and
disproportionate attacks against civilians and their property in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian army and/or the separatist
forces placed under their control. 28 The subsequently lodged Ukraine
v. Russia applications raise similar legal and factual complexities.29
Those cases are likely to lead to principled conclusions, for example,
the alleged violation of the right to free elections under Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 in separatist areas de facto controlled by Russia33 or
Russia's alleged jurisdiction on account of its "effective control over
325. Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 41, 45.
326. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 32; Adali v. Turkey, App. No.
38187/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-68670;
Kakoulli v. Turkey, App. No. 38595/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 89 (2001).
327. See Cyprus, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 49; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App.
No. 46347/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 20, 22 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
71800.
328. Georgia v. Russia, App. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 2-3 (2011).
329. See ECtHR Press Release, Case Concerning Events in Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine, supra note 20.
330. Id.
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Crimea and-by controlling separatists and armed groups there-de
facto control over the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk."33
However, an interstate case might not be the only case to pronounce
a judgment of principle: for example, the Cyprus v. Turkey (IV)
judgment largely relied on the previous Loizidou case, decided by the
Grand Chamber in an individual application.32 In other regions where
no inter-state application was submitted like Transnistria or Nagorno-
Karabakh, individual cases gave rise to judgments of principle. The
llascu, Chiragov, and Sargsyan judgments concerned Transnistria and
Nagorno-Karabakh, respectively, where no inter-state complaint has
been lodged. In all these leading decisions, the Grand Chamber has
answered fundamental admissibility questions such as jurisdiction
ratione loci, ratione personae, victim status, or the availability and
effectiveness of domestic remedies in the given separatist area. The
fact that in those cases the designated Chambers relinquished
jurisdiction in favor of the Grand Chamber, indicated a serious
question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or the
importance to ensure the consistency with previous case law,333 and
thus, paved the way to a leading decision.
The above-mentioned procedural techniques all serve to coordinate
the settlement of cases filed by a mass of applicants from areas outside
of the territorial State's effective control. The choice and combination
of the given procedural techniques depend on the factual and legal
background of the pending applications. Beyond the pending inter-
state applications that should lead, on account of their factual
complexities and the high number of individual concerned, to leading
cases, the pilot procedure and the joined or simultaneous examination
of cases might equally rationalize the settlement of the claims of
concurrent applicants. Their application is not exclusive, but the Court
should combine them as far as possible. For example, the Lisnyy case
joined three applications, the Court seems to have prioritized its
settlement334 and the decision on admissibility can be regarded as a
331. Id.
332. See e.g., Cyprus, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21-25.
333. European Convention on Human Rights art. 30, supra note 2.
334. Lisnyy v. Ukraine, App. Nos. 5355115 et al., Eur. Ct. H.R. 22 (2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-165566 (observing that while the applications
were lodged between December 2014 and September 2015, the Court gave its
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leading case.
V. CONCURRENT RESPONDENT STATES
The litigation of a single claim against multiple respondent States
in one procedure is not uncommon in the practice of international
tribunals.35 Good administration of justice and judicial economy
might justify the adjudication on the responsibility of multiple States
in a single judgment.36
Separatist areas present a particular case for attributing wrongful
acts to multiple respondent States: instead of a vacuum of authorities,
in fact many subjects of international law operate in the given region.
The relevant actors might be the territorial State or the subject
controlling the area, such as an occupying power or several occupying
powers, an outside State controlling a leased territory, an outside State
controlling or supporting in various means non-state de facto
authorities, an international organization, or various States
administering the territory.3 However, applicants can address their
complaints to the ECtHR only against human rights violations "by one
of the High Contracting Parties" to the Convention.38 This means that
applicants can address their claims against more than one respondent
inadmissibility decision in less than one year on July 28, 2016).
335. See e.g., Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States
- Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/AB/R
(adopted May 18, 2011) (relating to a large-scale case involving multiple members
of the European Community and other member states of the WTO); Panel Report,
European Communities and its Member States - Tariff Treatment of Certain
Information Technology Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS375/R (adopted Aug. 16,
2010) (showing that the WTO responded to three different disputes by including the
reports from the three different complainants, U.S., Japan, and China, into one large
Panel Report); Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fra., Gr. Brit. &
N. Ir., & U.S.), Preliminary Question, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 19, 21 (noting that both
Italy and Albania had made applications to the ICJ regarding the same issue of
Albania's claim over the gold and who has priority to receive it in the end).
336. Paparinskis, supra note 243, at 304.
337. Samantha Besson, Concurrent Responsibilities under the European
Convention on Human Rights: The Concurrence of Human Rights Jurisdictions,
Duties and Responsibilities, in The European Convention on Human Rights and
General International Law (Anne van Aaken and Julia Motoc eds., 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-2841203, at 1, 7 (recognizing that various
scenarios exist outside the context of separatist areas as well).
338. European Convention on Human Rights arts. 33-34, supra note 2.
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State and if each of those States have jurisdiction under Article 1 of
the ECHR over the challenged conduct, he ECtHR will pronounce on
their "concurrent jurisdiction." '339 In this case, the Court will determine
the responsibility of each of the respondent States and might engage
their concurrent (dual or multiple) responsibility.4 Where more than
one State contributes to a single human rights violation, the so-called
concurrent responsibility arises between independent wrongdoers.4'
The Court recognized the jurisdiction, a threshold criterion of the
applicability of Article 1 of the ECHR, of concurrent States parties,
and their concurrent responsibility in various cases in separatist areas.
Concurrent respondent States such as the territorial State, the outside
State exercising effective control over the defacto authorities, or even
another third State, can be designated either by the applicant (Part
V.A) or exceptionally the ECtHR proprio motu (Part V.B). As this
Part will explain, coordination is made at the time of the identification
of the respondent States: the application can only be made after a pre-
determination of the allocation of concurrent jurisdictions, duties and
State responsibility among the concerned States parties.
A. COORDINATION BY THE APPLICANT
Concurrent respondent States are normally designated by the
applicant who shall evaluate, before filing the application, which
States can be responsible for the alleged human rights violations. The
first application against multiple respondent States submitted from a
separatist area was the Ila~cu v. Moldova andRussia case, concerning
alleged human rights violations of four Moldovan nationals while
detained in the separatist Transnistrian part of Moldova by de facto
339. Gtizelyurtlu v. Cyprus, App. No. 36925/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 219, 230, 237
(2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-172460; Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014-
VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, 302.
340. Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2015)
(Yudkivska, G., concurring), http://hudoc.echr.coe.inteng?i-001-155662.
341. See Maarten den Heijer, Shared Responsibility Before the European Court
of Human Rights, 60 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 411, 414-416 (2013); see also Besson,
supra note 337, at 14-16 (acknowledging that concurrent responsibilities that arise
from the same wrongful act are called 'shared responsibilities,' or stricto sensu, but
that the latter term is used to refer to different types of concurrent responsibilities
independently of the same wrongful act).
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authorities . 4 2 The applicants argued that "the Moldovan authorities
were responsible under the Convention for the alleged infringements
of their human rights enshrined in the ECHR, since they had not taken
any appropriate steps to put an end to them."'343 Furthermore, they
alleged that the Russian Federation shared responsibility since the
territory of Transnistria was under de facto Russian control, on
account of the Russian troops and military equipment stationed there,
and the support allegedly given to the separatist regime by Russia.44
The applicants also claimed that Moldova and Russia had obstructed
the exercise of their right of individual application to the Court (Article
34 of the ECHR) 45 The Court accepted the applicants' argumentation
and held both States individually responsible for their own conduct.
Moldova was held responsible for its own failure to discharge its
positive obligations under Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR vis-Ai-vis
individuals within its territory, notwithstanding its lack of effective
control over the separatist region, as far as it had the means to take
appropriate steps.46 The Russian Federation was held responsible for
the same violations of the applicants' human rights on account of the
effective authority or decisive influence it exerted over the separatist
regime.4 Furthermore, both respondent S ates incurred responsibility
for the breach of Article 34 of the Convention.48 Because the
applicants could effectively establish that both States had jurisdiction
over the situation - Moldova on account of its sovereignty over the
region out of its effective control, and Russia on the basis of its de
facto control over the subordinated administration - the respondent
States had concurrent obligations under the Convention and the
violations led to their independent responsibility.49 The attribution of
conduct of non-state actors to an outside State and the residual positive
obligations of the territorial State goes hand in hand with concurrent
342. Ilascu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, 195-97 (2004).
343. Id. at 192.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 293-96.
347. Id. at 290-93.
348. Id. at 298-99.
349. See den Heijer, supra note 341, at 416 (raising issues about the allocation of
damages based on a single harmful outcome that has established independent
violations).
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jurisdictions and duties, and might be applicable to any comparable
situations where the territorial State has lost effective control over a
part of its territory and another outside State exercises various forms
(military, economic, political etc.) of control over the local authorities.
Since the Ila~cu judgment until the end of 2017, twelve other cases
submitted from Transnistria both against Moldova and the Russian
Federation have been decided on the merits by the ECtHR 5 ° In all but
one subsequent cases,35' only Russia incurred responsibility for the
human rights violations directly caused by the Transnistrian defacto
authorities, based on its effective control or decisive influence over the
subordinated administration. Moldovan authorities, however, have
progressed in providing positive measures towards individuals in the
separatist region, and the Court found in most cases that Moldova
fulfilled its positive obligations. This means that the division of
concurrent jurisdictions established in the Ila~cu case not only has
been adopted by subsequent applicants as a litigation strategy, but has
led to better compliance by the Moldovan authorities with the ECHR.
Furthermore, applicants from other separatist regions have started to
rely on this litigation strategy and to file their case against both the
territorial State and the outside State controlling the de facto
350. See generally Draci v. Moldova, App. No. 5349/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-177651; Braga v. Moldova, App. No.
76957/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-177650;
Eriomenco v. Moldova, App. No. 42224/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-173465; Vardanean v. Moldova, App. No. 22200/10, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-173802; Soyma v. Moldova,
App. No. 1203/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
173797; Apcov v. Moldova, App. No. 13463/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-173798; Paduret v. Moldova, App. No. 26626/11, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-173464; Turturica v. Moldova,
App. Nos. 28648/06 & 18832/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-166480; Mozer v. Moldova, App. No. 11138/10, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-161055; Pisari v. Moldova, App.
No. 42139/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-153925;
Catan v. Moldova, App. Nos. 43370/04, 8252/05, 18454/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-114082; Ivantoc v. Moldova, App. No.
23687/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-107480.
351. See Braga, App. No. 76957/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, 60, 68 (identifying this
as the exception case where Moldova was found responsible for the violation of
Articles 3, 5, and 34).
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administration.52
Arguably, any civil or criminal proceedings conducted in an area
out of the territorial State's effective control might give rise to the
concurrent jurisdictions of the territorial State and the State controlling
the subordinated administration. This was the case in the recently
decided Giizelyurtlu v. Cyprus and Turkey judgment,353 concerning the
simultaneous criminal proceedings of the Republic of Cyprus and the
de facto "TRNC" against eight persons accused of the abduction of
three Cypriot nationals of Turkish-Cypriot origin from Northern
Cyprus and their killing in the Cypriot Government-controlled area.
The Court found that the suspected perpetrators of the murder of the
applicants' relatives were within Turkey's jurisdiction, either in the
"TRNC" or in mainland Turkey,354 whereas the applicants' relatives'
deaths had taken place in the territory controlled by the Republic of
Cyprus and under that State's jurisdiction; therefore, a procedural
obligation arose in respect of Cyprus.355 Consequently, as both States
have jurisdiction, they had procedural obligations under the right to
life (Article 2), especially the duty to cooperate with inquiries or
hearings conducted within the jurisdiction of another Contracting
State concerning the use of unlawful force resulting in death.3 56 The
novelty of the Giizelyurtlu was the State party's obligation to
cooperate, even with de facto authorities. This means that in cases
involving concurrent jurisdictions with an alleged violation of the
right to life (Article 2) or the right to physical integrity (prohibition of
torture under Article 3, prohibition of slavery and forced labour under
Article 4), the concerned States parties have a duty to cooperate in the
prevention, and the investigation, of the human rights violations. With
this conclusion, the Court went well beyond the independent
352. See, e.g., Giizelyurtlu v. Cyprus, App. No. 36925/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-172460; see also ECtHR Press Release, Case
Concerning Events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, supra note 20; Parastayev v.
Russia, App. No. 50514/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2011).
353. See generally Giizelyurtlu, App. No. 36925/07, Eur. Ct. H.R.
354. Id. 187.
355. Id. 262.
356. Id. 284; see also Rantsev v. Cyprus, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 120, 126-27
("Member States are also subject to a duty in crossborder trafficking cases to
cooperate effectively with the relevant authorities of other States concerned in the
investigation of events which occurred outside their territories.").
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examination of the respondent States' jurisdiction and responsibility
and established a coordination of the States' positive obligations.
Furthermore, concurrent jurisdictions might be multiplied if the
applicant is not a national of the territorial State or the outside State
controlling the subordinated de facto administration, but of a third
State. Some applications from Transnistria have extended the scope of
respondent State beyond Moldova and Russia, and complained that
the applicant's State of nationality breached also the Convention by
not complying with its positive obligations towards its national.5
However, the Court's precedents do not confirm such a third State
jurisdiction based only on the victim's nationality. Whereas citizens
of the State might be under the authority of consular and diplomatic
agents and might ask for consular or diplomatic protection against
alleged human rights violations abroad, this hypothesis does not lead
to due diligence obligations because the ECtHR does not recognize a
human right to diplomatic protection.58 In a case where the applicant
similarly relied on the I/a~cujudgment about the State's positive
obligations under Article 1 of the ECHR, including, inter alia, to take
diplomatic measures, the Court held that there was a fundamental
difference between the Ila~cu judgment and other claims related to
diplomatic protection.59  Contrary to human rights violations
occurring abroad, in the Ila~cu case, the Court asserted the territorial
State's jurisdiction over individuals in a part of its territory, out of its
effective control, because the State "does not thereby cease to have
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention over
that part of its territory temporarily subject to a local authority
sustained by rebel forces or by another State."36 In another more
recent Transnistrian case, the applicants tried to establish the
jurisdiction of the victim's State of nationality (Ukraine), beyond that
of the territorial State (Moldova), and the outside State controlling the
357. Soyma v. Moldova, App. No. 1203/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 16 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-00 1-173797; Totchi v. Moldova, App. No. 8833/10,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-116634.
358. M. v. Italy, App. No. 40020/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 127 (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-112576; see also Orel v. Croatia, App. No.
51506/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-164657.
359. Orel, App. No. 51506/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 74.
360. Id.
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territory (Russia), arguably based on the Ila~cu case about Moldova's
positive obligations towards individuals in its territory outside its
effective control.361 However, the Court held that the applicants did
not adduce any evidence in support of the allegation that Ukraine had
jurisdiction in the case, so it rejected this complaint with respect to the
State of nationality. 62 Therefore, the difference lies in the territorial
State's sovereignty over the given area; whereas other third States
without sovereignty over the area, effective control, or decisive
influence over the subordinated de facto authorities, do not seem to
have jurisdiction, unless the applicant can prove some more direct
causality with the human rights violation. Such a direct causality can
be, for example, a continuous cross-border act constituting a human
rights violation such as human trafficking,
3 63 asylum transfer,3 64
custody procedures to restore the bond between a parent and a child
being in another country,3 65 abduction or deportation of persons or any
incident of unlawful violence leading to loss of life.366 Such cross-
border cases might involve the jurisdiction of a State party if its
domestic conduct produces extraterritorial effects. Under a
progressive interpretation ofjurisdiction, the State's jurisdiction might
be instigated on account of its omission to take due diligence measures
to prevent and mitigate foreseeable violations.36
361. Soyma, App. No. 1203/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 16.
362. Id.
363. See Rantsev v. Cyprus, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 207 (finding that "[in light
of the fact that the alleged trafficking commenced in Russia and in view of the
obligations undertaken by Russia to combat trafficking," Russia had jurisdiction
over the death of the victim, even though it occurred abroad).
364. See M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255,336-343 (2011) (asserting
that a state deciding on the transfer of an asylum seeker incurs responsibility, where
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faces
a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment in the receiving country).
365. See Monory v. Hungary, App. No. 71099/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 89-92 (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-68713 (considering that the overall length of
the custody procedures initiated in a country other than the State of residence of the
child was excessive and failed to meet the "reasonable time" requirement).
366. Gfizelyurtlu v. Cyprus, App. No. 36925/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-172460.
367. See Environment and Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, 101-02 (Nov. 15, 2017) (listing the States'
obligations and responsibilities that are necessary to avoid future violations,
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The court rejected some later applications directed against multiple
respondent States other than the State of nationality, either because the
conduct was attributable not to the respondent States, but to an
international organization administering the territory,368 or because the
applicant failed to challenge a particular action or inaction by those
States or to substantiate any breach by the respondent State of its
positive duty to take all the appropriate measures with regard to the
applicant's rights.369 For instance, some applicants allegedly used the
jurisdictional link based on causality to complain that one of the
guarantor States of the Budapest Memorandum on Security
Assurances3 ° (providing security assurances relating to Ukraine's
accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons),
namely the United Kingdom, was responsible for its omission to
prevent human rights violations by Russia in Ukrainian territory."' In
some Northern Cyprus disappearance cases, the application was
directed not only against the territorial State, Cyprus, but also against
Greece, claiming that in the incidents of 1963-1964 in Northern
Cyprus, Greek soldiers or militia were acting under the orders of the
Republic of Greece alongside the Cypriot forces and consequently, the
case instigated also the jurisdiction of Greece.2 The Court held that
specifically discussing environmental damages); Vassilis P. Tzevelekos and Elena
Katselli Proukaki, Migrants at Sea: A Duty of Plural States to Protect
(Extraterritorially)?, 86 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 427, 445-47 (2017) (summarizing that
while States' have the discretion in determining the method they take to offer
protection, they still must do the best they can in offering protection).
368. See Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 &
78166/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 141, 143 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-
80830 (finding that the conduct of the international security and civil presences
administrating Kosovo were attributable to the UN).
369. Stephens v. Cyprus, App. No. 45267/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 7 (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-90868.
370. See generally Letter dated 7 Dec. 1994 from the Permanent Reps. of Russia,
Ukraine, the U.K., and the U.S. to the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General
(Budapest Memorandum), U.N. Doc. A/49/765 (Dec. 19, 1994).
371. EUR. PARL. Ass., Comm. on Legal Aff. & Hum. Rts., Legal Remedies for
Human Rights Violations on the Ukrainian Territories Outside the Control of the
Ukrainian Authorities, Doc. 14139, 57 (2016) (discussing the potential difficulty
in establishing "that the United Kingdom not only had a legal duty to intervene
against Russia [ ... ] but also somehow exercised 'effective control' over the
conflict zone by merely failing to intervene in the conflict" under the Budapest
Memorandum).
372. Emin v. Cyprus, App. No. 59623/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2012),
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it lacked temporal jurisdiction over those acts, because Greece ratified
the ECHR only on November 20, 1985.111 All these instances how
that the creative designation of concurrent respondents States if
concomitant with a proper jurisdictional basis for each co-respondent
is likely to enhance the applicant's chances of obtaining remedy at the
ECtHR. Various past cases submitted against a single respondent State
could have been directed against other co-respondents too.
374
Once the applicant directs the application against multiple
respondent States, the Court's final judgment on concurrent State
responsibility of independent wrongdoers will influence the
subsequent applicants' litigation strategy. After the Ilascu, Catan,
Mozer, and recently the Giizelyurtlu judgments, individuals are
encouraged to direct their applications against both the territorial State
and the State controlling the separatist area, or even a third State on
the basis of a properly identified jurisdictional link. Those concurrent
respondent States are likely to have concurrent jurisdiction, concurrent
positive obligations, and therefore arguably concurrent State
responsibility.3 7 The Court's engagement not to leave any area of the
European "legal space" in a vacuum, without the applicability of the
Convention,376 also confirms this likely scenario.
B. COORDINATION BY THE ECTHR PROPRIO MOTU
All the above-mentioned precedents show that it is the applicant
rather than the Court who decides on the concurrent respondent States.
Where the applicant failed to do so and designated only one
respondent State, the Court did not consider it entitled to direct ex
officio the application against another State party involved in the
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-99466.
373. Id.; Gunesel v. Cyprus, App. No. 30979/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 9 (2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-118970.
374. See, e.g., Ravlo v. Moldova, App. No. 31747/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-148043 (nothing the facts clearly revealed
human rights violations by the de facto "MRT" authorities whose conduct was
attributed to Russia in later cases).
375. Besson, supra note 337, at 2.
376. Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-155662 (Yudkivska, G., concurring) ("It is a
long-standing approach both by the Court and by the Council of Europe that no de
facto black holes are allowed to exist in Europe.").
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situation."' This shows that in the past, procedural economy prevailed,
and the Court examined only the claims against the respondent State
that the applicant designated. However, the effectiveness of the
Convention, and the intention to eliminate a vacuum of responsibility,
might justify the re-direction of the application against a co-
respondent State not designated by the applicant."8 Such a judicial
activism has already appeared in the case law: in the recent
Transnistrian case Kireev, filed by the applicant against Russia, the
Court decided that "the application also needs to be examined in
respect of Moldova."3 ' However, the re-direction of an application
against a new co-respondent State by the Court is problematic for two
reasons. First, it can run against the procedural autonomy of the
applicant under which principle the individual has the choice against
which Contracting Party he or she wishes to introduce an
application."' One can foresee situations where the applicant
voluntarily did not designate a State party as co-respondent, for
example, out of fear of retaliation or because he or she is public servant
of the same State.8' This is the reason why the draft agreement on the
377. See Jaloud v. Netherlands, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 229, 302 (focusing on the
jurisdiction of the Netherlands in this case, and not of the United Kingdom); see also
Khlebnik v. Ukraine, App. No. 2945/16, Eur. Ct. H.R. 16 (2017) (directing the
scope of the Court's examination to Ukraine and not the concurrent international
mechanisms of Ukraine and another High Contracting Party); Sargsyan, App. No.
40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Yudkivska, G., concurring) (stressing that "the Court is
obviously unable to examine proprio motu the issue of responsibility of a State
which was not party to the case at hand").
378. See CDDH Ad Hoc Group (CDDH-UE), Final Report for the CDDH- Fifth
Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH Ad Hoc Negotiation Group and the
European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European
Convention on Human Rights, 47+1(2013)008rev2, app. V 39 (2013) [hereinafter
Final Report for the CDDH- Fifth Negotiation Meeting] (intending to eliminate a
vacuum of responsibility by binding co-respondents under Article 46 of the
Convention in order to serve the proper administration of justice).
379. Kireev v. Moldova, App. No. 11375/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.inteng?i-001-88175.
380. Report Adopted by the Steering Comm. for Human Rights (CDDH) at its
53rd Meeting, Study of Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession
to the European Convention on Human Rights, 010 Addendum 2, 61 (2002)
[hereinafter CDDH Study of Technical and Legal Issues].
381. C.f Parastayev v. Russia and Georgia, App. No. 50514/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-108451 (describing the inverse scenario
where the applicant, after being appointed to a high-ranking post at the Ministry of
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accession of the European Union (EU) to the ECHR, which
empowered the Court to designate and hold responsible the EU or a
State Party as co-respondent, provided that before such a decision the
Court shall seek the views of the applicant.82 Thus, the Court shall
designate ex officio a new co-respondent State, only after duly taking
into account the interests of the applicant. Where the applicant did not
consider or simply forgot the possibility of directing the application
against the co-respondent State, the judicial activism to do so might
most often serve his or her interest.
Second, as commentators observed regarding the proposal to grant
the Court power to designate proprio motu the EU or a Contracting
Party as co-respondent, such a re-direction of the application would
often involve a pre-judgment as to the responsibility for a violation,383
and could render inoperative certain admissibility criteria in respect of
the new co-respondent (for example, the 6 months rule).84 In the
recent Transnistrian Kireev case, the Court did not need to decide
whether the exhaustion rule was satisfied with regard to Moldova, but
did not exclude that the rule applied.85 Examining the exhaustion rule
with regard to an ex officio designated co-respondent State seems like
a reasonable guarantee against improper judicial activism, while the
criticism on the predetermination of the responsibility for the alleged
violation is a necessary condition rather than a consequence of this
judicial technique. In fact, coordination between concurrent
respondent States requires that the Court, especially its Registry,
assesses the likely outcome of the Court's procedure on the merits.
Only with the possible outcome in mind, can the Court decide on the
proprio motu designation of a concurrent respondent State.
Justice of Georgia, withdrew his application against Georgia).
382. Final Report for the CDDH -Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 378,
app. I arts. 3(5), 3(7).
383. CDDH Study of Technical and Legal Issues, supra note 382, 59, 61;
accord Tobias Lock, EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for Judicial Review
in Strasbourg, 35 EUR. L. REV. 777, 786 (2010).
384. CDDH Study of Technical and Legal Issues, supra note 382, 59, 61; see
Final Report for the CDDH- Fifth Negotiation Meeting, supra note 378, app. 1 art.
3.1 (stating "[t]he admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to
the participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings").
385. Kireev v. Moldova, App. No. 11375/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intleng?i-001-88175.
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Another closely related coordinating function of the Court is the
invitation of third party interventions. The Convention empowers the
President of the Court, "in the interest of the proper administration of
justice," to "invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to
the proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to
submit written comments or take part in hearings."'386 The third party
intervention serves to allow the third party intervenor to defend its
interests, or one of its nationals, and to help the Court in establishing
the facts.8 Third party interventions by the State of nationality of the
applicants are especially common in individual applications from
separatist areas, also called "quasi interstate applications,"'388 due to
the underlying inter-state territorial conflict between the respondent
State and the third party intervenor. Third party intervention was
allowed, for example, in the Chiragov v. Armenia and Sargsyan v.
Azerbaijan cases wherein each case, the other State made use of its
right to intervene under Article 36(1) of the Convention.89 Similarly,
in various Northern Cyprus cases, the Cypriot Government
participated in the proceedings against Turkey as third party
intervenor,39 ° while the Turkish Government did the same when
Turkish-Cypriot applicants complained about their right to property in
the government controlled area or the investigation by Cypriot
authorities into the disappearance of their relative and/or the discovery
of the remains.9' The evidence and arguments that the intervening
386. European Convention on Human Rights art. 36(2), supra note 2.
387. den Heijer, supra note 341, at 415-16.
388. Apostol, supra note 134, 67-68; see Dean Spielmann, President, Eur.
Court of Human Rights, The European Court of Human Rights as Guarantor of a
Peaceful Public Order in Europe (Nov. 7, 2014).
389. See Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40167/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 4 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-155662 (reporting that the Armenian
Government intervened here under Article 36 of the Convention); see also Chiragov
v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. 4 (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i-001-155353 (reporting that the Azerbaijani Government intervened here
under Article 36 of the Convention).
390. E.g., Charalambous v. Turkey, App. No. 46744/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 41
(2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-110459; Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-
I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 374; Varnava v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 13, 24.
391. E.g., Emin v. Cyprus, App. 59623/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-99466; Kazali v. Cyprus, App. No. 49247/08,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 130 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-109812; Sofi v.
Cyprus, App. No. 18163/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
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governments provided facilitate the legal analytical and fact-finding
burden of the Court in legally and factually complex cases such as
"quasi inter-state applications," even if the case is not directed against
concurrent respondent States. The coordinating role of the Court is to
identify and inform the interested States parties of the proceedings.
3 92
Therefore, one can say that the coordinating method between
concurrent respondent States plays its main role in the designation of
the respondent governments by the applicant or by the Court proprio
motu on the basis of a properly identified jurisdictional link.
Furthermore, the Court should coordinate between concurrent
interested States by inviting third party interventions of States
factually linked to the underlying separatist conflict. These types of
coordinations favor judicial economy, good administration of justice,
and the effectiveness of the Convention in the sense that concurrent
jurisdictions and responsibilities will help to eliminate a vacuum of
responsibility in separatist areas.
VI. CONCLUSION
The method of coordinated settlement in the procedure of the
ECtHR is likely to enhance the efficiency of the Court's working
methods and allocate its scarce resources in a manner that allows it to
effectively respond to the most pressing general issues arising from
concurrent applications. The procedural techniques and substantive
law conclusions in precedents from separatist areas have shown that
the Court does not consider those applications i olated from each
other, but tries to settle them in a coordinated way, taking into account
the related procedural and substantive issues.
Facing the tendency towards forum shopping by applicants from
areas out of the territorial State's effective control, the Court should
continue to interpret the lis pendens and res judicata rules in a
restricted manner. Article 35(2)(b) of the ECHR only excludes
admissibility where the application before the Court concerns
eng?i-001-96984.
392. E.g., Joannou v. Turkey, App. No. 53240/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-179420 (observing that since the application
was submitted by a British and Cypriot national, the Court informed the British
Government and the Cypriot Government of the proceedings).
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substantially not only the same facts and complaints but also
introduced by the same persons. Concurrent procedures of
international investigation or settlement should only exclude the
admissibility of individual, rather than inter-state applications, and
only if those procedures are conducted by judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies. Furthermore, while deciding on the individual circumstances
of the cases before it, the Court should rely on the legal and factual
conclusions of other international bodies on the broader factual and
legal background of the underlying circumstances in the conflict area.
To treat concurrent applications ubmitted by numerous applicants
in a coordinated, rather than isolated way, the ECtHR should join cases
with identical legal and factual backgrounds and examine applications
simultaneously, whenever the cases present "symmetrical"
situations-when they are factually similar but slightly different. The
Court should moreover identify the existence of a structural or
systemic problem, or other similar dysfunction, so as to treat them in
a pilot procedure. For instance, the pilot procedure would be advisable
in matters of compensation procedures for lost property or the reform
of the investigation by de facto authorities on disappearance.
Representative individual applications or the pending inter-state cases
should serve as the major leading decisions to address general
problems such as jurisdiction ratione loci, ratione personae, victim
status, or the availability and effectiveness of domestic remedies in the
given separatist area.
Facing concurrent respondent States, the Court should continue to
rely on general international law and recognize concurrent State
responsibility of independent wrongdoers for their own conduct
leading to the same injury. Its coordination role should encompass the
designation of the co-respondent State(s) as an exception and the
invitation of third-party intervention. This eases the legal analytical
and fact-finding burden of the Court in legally and factually complex
cases.
The three different concurring elements require coordination at
different stages of the procedure: while concurrent procedures of
international investigation or settlement shall be assessed for the sake
of the Court's proceedings at the time of rendering its decision on the
admissibility (coordination of procedures) or the merits (coordination
[34:1
CONCURRENT APPLICA TION BEFORE THE ECTHR
of findings), the concurrence of applicants and respondent States
requires a coordination at an earlier stage of the proceedings. As
explained, the grouping or prioritization of concurrent applications
from several applicants requires a principled decision and the
designation of the responsible Court formation at the early stage of the
case. This procedural decision will be strategic as it may determine the
outcome of the concurrent cases. Furthermore, the choice of the
concurrent respondent States operates at the litigation strategy level of
the applicant before submitting the application. Precedents show that
the Court will likely establish multiple State responsibility in
separatist areas, where an outside State has effective control or
decisive influence over the de facto authorities. Thus, it is in the
applicants' interest to prepare a litigation strategy against multiple
States involved in the territorial situation.
The coordinated method of settling concurrent applications has
various examples in the procedural tools used by the Court in recent
years: the coordination of procedures and findings of other dispute
settlement bodies, the grouping of similar applications for a single
judgment or decision, the prioritization of individual cases (the stricto
sensu priority policy, the pilot judgment procedure, and leading cases),
as well as the designation of co-respondent States. While all of those
procedural tools might be considered as further steps towards
constitutional justice,393  coordination should be followed by
procedural guarantees evaluating the specific circumstances of each
individual application. If coupled with such a principled caution,
coordination can be considered as a method fitting in the framework
of individual justice. Therefore, coordination as a method is
confirmation for those commentators who claim that individual and
constitutional justice do not exclude each other, but are interdependent
functions ."
393. Doc. 13719, supra note 60, 65; Greer & Wildhaber, supra note 33, at 671-
72 (analyzing that the Convention must select and adjudicate cases effectively, in
order to follow through with the concept of constitutional justice and recognizing
that this is already slowly occurring).
394. EuR. PARL. Ass., Comm. on Legal Aff & Hum. Rts., Guaranteeing the
Authority and Effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights, Doc.
12811, 10 (2012); accord Patricia Egli, Protocol No. 14 to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:
Towards a More Effective Control Mechanism?, 17 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1,
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All coordination techniques between concurrent applications
require that the Court assesses the likely outcome of the Court's
procedure with regard to the merits. Decisions on the joined or
simultaneous examination of applications, the prioritization of cases,
the selection of a leading case, the relinquishment of jurisdiction in
favor of the Grand Chamber, or the exceptional case of designation of
the co-respondent State proprio motu all suppose some preliminary
assessment of the likely outcome as to the admissibility and the merits
of the concurrent applications. Arguably, this is a task delegating
power from the judges to the Registry: it is at the phase of the
registration and classification of the applications that he method of
coordination is primarily operated. Therefore, the Registry staff
should link together the interconnected legal and factual background
along with procedural and substantive law questions of concurrent
cases, which suppose some prejudgment on the merits of the case. The
consequence of this method is "secretarization"'395 beyond the already
widely recognized "judicialization"396 of international relations and
especially of human rights, i.e. the increased importance of the registry
of international courts in the adjudication.
In sum, the Court should act in its coordinator function in settling
thousands of pending applications from separatist areas outside the
territorial State's effective control. Coordinating between concurrent
applications ensures the coherence of the case law and the
effectiveness of the Convention, while easing the Court's workload
from the same conflict-torn regions.
25-27 (2007); Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan Greene, Restructuring the European
Court of Human Rights: Preserving the Right of Individual Petition and Promoting
Constitutionalism, PUB. L. 710, 712-13, 716-718 (2013).
395. I am grateful to Jean d'Aspremont for introducing this notion in the
discussion about the topic.
396. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION xi (Cesare
Romano et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
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